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This study conducts a quantitative analysis of the role of financial shocks and
credit frictions affecting the banking sector in driving business cycles as well as the
role of reserve requirements as a macroprudential policy tool. In the first chapter,
I first empirically document three stylized business cycle facts of aggregate finan-
cial variables in the U.S. commercial banking sector for the period 1987-2010: (i)
Bank credit, deposits and loan spread are less volatile than output, while net worth
and leverage ratio are more volatile, (ii) bank credit and net worth are procyclical,
while deposits, leverage ratio and loan spread are countercyclical, and (iii) finan-
cial variables lead the output fluctuations by one to three quarters. I then present
an equilibrium business cycle model with a financial sector, featuring a moral haz-
ard problem between banks and its depositors, which leads to endogenous capital
constraints for banks in obtaining funds from households. Credit frictions in bank-
ing sector are modeled as in Gertler and Karadi (2011). The model incorporates
empirically-disciplined shocks to bank net worth (i.e. “financial shocks”) that al-
ter the ability of banks to borrow and to extend credit to non-financial businesses.
The model is calibrated to U.S. data from 1987 to 2010. I show that the bench-
mark model driven by both standard productivity and financial shocks is able to
deliver most of the stylized facts about real and financial variables simultaneously.
Financial shocks and credit frictions in banking sector are important not only for
explaining the dynamics of aggregate financial variables but also for the dynamics
of standard macroeconomic variables. Financial shocks play a major role in driving
real fluctuations due to their strong impact on the tightness of bank capital con-
straint and credit spread, which eventually affect the saving-investment nexus of the
economy. Finally, the tightness of bank capital constraint given by the Lagrange
multiplier in the theoretical model (which determines the banks’ ability to extend
credit to non-financial firms) tracks the index of tightening credit standards (which
shows the adverse changes in banks’ lending) constructed by the Federal Reserve
Board quite well.
The second chapter (coauthored with Enes Sunel and Temel Taşkın) under-
takes a quantitative investigation of the role of reserve requirements as a credit
policy tool. We build a monetary DSGE model with a banking sector in which
(i) an agency problem between households and banks leads to endogenous capital
constraints for banks in obtaining funds from households, (ii) banks are subject to
time-varying reserve requirements that countercyclically respond to expected credit
growth, (iii) households face cash-in-advance constraints, requiring them to hold
real balances, and (iv) standard productivity and money growth shocks are two
sources of aggregate uncertainty. We calibrate the model to the Turkish economy
which is representative of using reserve requirements as a macroprudential policy
tool recently. We also consider the impact of financial shocks that affect the net
worth of financial intermediaries. We find that (i) the time-varying required reserve
ratio rule mitigates the negative effects of the financial accelerator mechanism trig-
gered by adverse macroeconomic and financial shocks, (ii) in response to TFP and
money growth shocks, countercyclical reserves policy reduces the volatilities of key
real macroeconomic and financial variables compared to fixed reserves policy over
the business cycle, and (iii) an operational time-varying reserve requirement policy
is welfare superior to a fixed reserve requirement policy. The credit policy is most
effective when the economy is hit by a financial shock. Time-varying required re-
serves policy reduces the intertemporal distortions created by the credit spreads at
expense of generating higher inflation volatility, indicating an interesting trade-off
between price stability and financial stability.
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Chapter 1
Financial Intermediaries, Credit Shocks, and Business Cycles
1.1 Introduction
What are the cyclical properties of financial flows in the U.S. banking sec-
tor? How important are financial shocks relative to standard productivity shocks in
driving real and financial business cycles in the U.S.? To address these questions,
this study proposes an equilibrium real business cycle model with a financial sector,
that is capable of matching both real and financial fluctuations observed in the U.S.
data. Although the relevance of financial shocks together with an explicit model-
ing of frictions in financial sector has received attention recently, the behavior of
aggregate financial variables in the U.S. banking sector and how they interact with
real variables over the business cycle have not been fully explored in the literature.1
Most previous studies have not tried to match fluctuations in both standard macro
variables and aggregate financial variables simultaneously. In this chapter, I show
that financial shocks to the banking sector contribute significantly to explaining the
observed dynamics of real and financial variables. Financial shocks play a major
role in driving real fluctuations due to their impact on the tightness of bank capital
constraint and hence credit spread.
1See Christiano et. al. (2010), Dib (2010), Meh and Moran (2010), Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2010), Gertler and Karadi (2011), Kollman et al. (2011).
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I first systematically document the business cycle properties of aggregate fi-
nancial variables, using the data on U.S. commercial banks from the Federal Reserve
Board.2 The following empirical facts emerge from the analysis: (i) Bank credit,
deposits, and loan spread are less volatile than output, while net worth and leverage
ratio are more volatile, (ii) bank assets and net worth are procyclical, while deposits,
leverage ratio, and loan spread are countercyclical, and (iii) financial variables lead
the output fluctuations by one to three quarters.
I then assess the quantitative performance of a theoretical model by its ability
to match these empirical facts. In particular, there are two main departures from
an otherwise standard real business cycle framework. The first departure is that
I introduce an active banking sector with financial frictions into the model, which
are modeled as in Gertler and Karadi (2011). Financial frictions require that banks
borrow funds from households and their ability to borrow is limited due to a moral
hazard (costly enforcement) problem, leading to an endogenous capital constraint
for banks in obtaining deposits.3 This departure is needed in order to have balance
sheet fluctuations of financial sector matter for real fluctuations. The second depar-
ture is that the model incorporates shocks to bank net worth (i.e.“financial shocks”)
that alter the ability of banks to borrow and to extend credit to non-financial busi-
nesses.4 In the context of the theoretical model, this shock can be interpreted as
2I also document the business cycle properties of aggregate financial variables of the whole U.S.
financial sector from 1952 to 2009, using the Flow of Funds data. Interested readers may look at
Appendix A.3.
3Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) argue that moral hazard in banking sector plays a
crucial role in most of the U.S. economic downturns in the last century. Moreover, the presence
of the agency problem makes the balance sheet structure of financial sector matter for real fluctu-
ations, invalidating the application of Modigliani-Miller theorem to the model economy presented
below.
4Hancock, Laing and Wilcox (1995), Peek and Rosengren (1997, 2000) empirically show that
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a redistribution shock, which transfers some portion of the wealth from financial
intermediaries to households.5 However, because of the moral hazard problem be-
tween households and bankers, it distorts intermediaries’ role of allocating resources
between households and firms, inducing large real effects.
I construct the time series of financial shocks as the residuals from the law of
motion for bank net worth, using empirical data for credit spread, leverage ratio,
deposit rate and net worth. This approach is similar to the standard method for
constructing productivity shocks as Solow residuals from the production function
using empirical series for output, capital and labor.6 The shock series show that U.S.
economy is severely hit by negative financial shocks in the Great Recession. Finally,
in order to elucidate the underlying mechanism as clearly as possible, I abstract
from various real and nominal rigidities that are generally considered in medium
scale DSGE models such as Christiano et. al.(2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007).
adverse shocks to bank capital contributed significantly to the U.S. economic downturns of the
late 1980s and early 1990s. Theoretically, Meh and Moran (2010) consider shocks that originate
within the banking sector and produce sudden shortages in bank capital. They suggest that these
shocks reflect periods of financial distress and weakness in financial markets. Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2009) introduce shocks to bank capital and interpret them as independent shocks arising
from other activities like investment banking. Curdia and Woodford (2010) introduce exogenous
increases in the fraction of loans that are not repaid and exogenous increases in real financial inter-
mediation costs, both of which reduce net worth of financial intermediaries exogenously. Mendoza
and Quadrini (2010) study the effect of net worth shocks on asset prices and interpret these shocks
as unexpected loan losses due to producers’ default on their debt. A complete model of the deter-
mination of the fluctuations in net worth of banks is beyond the scope of this study, because my
goal is to analyze the quantitative effects of movements in net worth of financial sector on business
cycle fluctuations of real and financial variables.
5This interpretation is suggested by Iacoviello (2010). He argues that 1990-91 and 2007-09
recessions can be characterized by situations in which some borrowers pay less than contractually
agreed upon and financial institutions that extend loans to these borrowers suffer from loan losses,
resulting in some sort of a redistribution of wealth between borrowers (households and firms) and
lenders (banks).
6I also consider some alternative measures of financial shocks, including the one constructed
based on loan losses incurred by U.S. commercial banks (using the charge-off and delinquency rates
data compiled by the Federal Reserve Board). The construction of these alternative measures and
their simulation results can be found in Appendix A.4. The main results of the study do not
change under these alternative measures.
3
The business cycle accounting exercise in this study is important in the sense
that explaining the dynamics of balance sheet fluctuations in the U.S. banking sec-
tor can help us better understand, capture and predict the dynamics of standard
macroeconomic variables as the financial flows in the U.S. banking sector are highly
cyclical and lead the output fluctuations by one to three quarters. Therefore, the
dynamics of financial variables in the U.S. banking sector may serve as additional
state variables for explaining real fluctuations. This study is one of the first studies,
which rigorously addressed this issue. It is also the first work that tried to match
fluctuations in both standard macro variables and aggregate financial variables of
U.S. banking sector simultaneously. Finally, in order to start thinking about how
different policy tools can be implemented in an environment in which the financial
sector is crucial for business cycle fluctuations and what the welfare implications of
these policies are, we need a model capable of matching real and financial fluctua-
tions simultaneously. It could be asserted that the model proposed in this study is
quite successful in this dimension.
In the theoretical model, there are three main results. First, the benchmark
model driven by both standard productivity and financial shocks is able to deliver
most of the stylized cyclical facts about real and financial variables simultaneously.
Second, financial shocks to banking sector are important not only for explaining the
dynamics of financial variables but also for the dynamics of standard macroeconomic
variables. In particular, the model simulations show that the benchmark model
driven by both shocks has better predictions about investment, hours and output
than the frictionless version of the model (which is standard RBC model with capital
4
adjustment costs) and than the model driven only by productivity shocks. The
benchmark model also performs better than the model with only productivity shocks
in terms of its predictions about aggregate financial variables.7 Third, the tightness
of bank capital constraint given by the Lagrange multiplier in the theoretical model
(which determines the banks’ ability to extend credit to non-financial firms) tracks
the index of tightening credit standards (which shows the adverse changes in banks’
lending) constructed by the Federal Reserve Board quite well.
The economic intuition for why financial shocks matter a lot for real fluctua-
tions in the model lies in the effect of these shocks on the tightness of bank capital
constraint and credit spread. When financial shocks move the economy around the
steady state, they lead to large fluctuations in the tightness of bank capital con-
straint as evidenced by the big swings in the Lagrange multiplier of the constraint.
Since credit spread is a function of this Lagrange multiplier, fluctuations in the
latter translate into variations in the former. Credit spread appears as a positive
wedge in the intertemporal Euler equation, which determines how households’ de-
posits (savings in the economy) are transformed into bank credit to non-financial
firms. Fluctuations in this wedge move the amount of deposits, therefore the amount
of bank credit that can be extended to firms. Since productive firms finance their
capital expenditures via bank credit, movements in the latter translate into the fluc-
tuations in capital stock. Because hours worked is complementary to capital stock
in a standard Cobb-Douglas production function, empirically-relevant fluctuations
7The RBC model with capital adjustment costs has no predictions about financial variables
since balance sheets of banks in that model are indeterminate.
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in capital stock lead to empirically-observed fluctuations in hours, which eventually
generate observed fluctuations in output.
This study contributes to recently growing empirical and theoretical literature
studying the role of financial sector on business cycle fluctuations. On the empirical
side, Adrian and Shin (2008, 2009) provide evidence on the time series behavior
of balance sheet items of some financial intermediaries using the Flow of Funds
data.8 However, they do not present standard business cycle statistics of financial
flows.9 On the theoretical side, the current work differs from the existing literature
on financial accelerator effects on demand for credit, arising from the movements
in the strength of borrowers’ balance sheets.10 I focus on fluctuations in supply of
credit driven by movements in the strength of lenders’ balance sheets. Meh and
Moran (2010) investigate the role of bank capital in transmission of technology,
bank capital and monetary policy shocks in a medium-scale New Keynesian, double
moral hazard framework. Jermann and Quadrini (2010) study the importance of
credit shocks in non-financial sector in explaining the cyclical properties of equity
and debt payouts of U.S. non-financial firms in a model without a banking sector.
An independent study that is closely related and complementary to our work is
Iacoviello (2011). In a DSGE framework with households, banks, and entrepreneurs
each facing endogenous borrowing constraints, he studies how repayment shocks
8They argue that to the extent that balance sheet fluctuations affect the supply of credit, they
have the potential to explain real fluctuations, and they empirically show that bank equity has a
significant forecasting power for GDP growth.
9The notion of “procyclical” in their papers is with respect to total assets of financial inter-
mediaries, not with respect to GDP as in the current study. In that sense, this study undertakes
a more standard business cycle accounting exercise.
10For example, see Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998), Bernanke, Gertler,
and Gilchrist (1999)
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undermine the flow of funds between savers and borrowers in the recent recession.
My work is different from his study in terms of both empirical and theoretical con-
tributions. First, in terms of empirical work, I systemically document the business
cycle properties of aggregate financial variables in the U.S. banking sector from 1987
to 2010, which I then use to judge the quantitative performance of the theoretical
model, while his work particularly focuses on the 2007-09 recession. Second, in the
theoretical model presented below, only the banking sector faces endogenous capital
constraints, which gives me the ability to isolate the role of banks in the transmis-
sion of financial shocks from the role of household and production sectors. Finally,
I employ a different methodology of constructing the series of financial shocks from
the data. In terms of normative policy, Angeloni and Faia (2010) examine the role
of banks in the interaction between monetary policy and macroprudential regula-
tions in a New Keynesian model with bank runs, while Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010),
and Gertler and Karadi (2011) investigate the effects of central bank’s credit pol-
icy aimed at troubled banks.11 Finally, in an open-economy framework, Kollmann
(2011) studies how a bank capital constraint affects the international business cycles
driven by productivity and loan default shocks in a two-country RBC model with a
global bank.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: In Section 1.2, I document
evidence on the real and financial fluctuations in U.S. data. Section 1.3 describes the
theoretical model. Section 1.4 presents the model parametrization and calibration
together with the quantitative results of the model. Section 1.5 concludes.
11The latter also features the interbank market.
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1.2 Real and Financial Fluctuations in the U.S. economy
This section documents some key empirical features of financial cycles in the
U.S. economy. The upper left panel of Figure 1 displays quarterly time series for
loan losses of U.S. commercial banks from 1987 to 2010. The loan loss rates are
expressed as annualized percentages of GDP. The figure shows that loan loss rates
increased in last three recessions of the U.S. economy. The loss rates peaked in both
1990-91 and 2007-09 recessions, reaching its highest level of 5% in the latter. The
upper right panel of Figure 1 plots daily time series for Dow Jones Bank Index from
1992 to 2010. The figure suggests that the market value of banks’ shares declined
substantially in the recent recession. Finally, the middle left panel of Figure 1
displays real net worth growth of U.S. commercial banks (year-on-year). The figure
suggests that banks’ net worth shrank in last three recessions of the U.S. economy,
with a reduction of 40% in the 2007-09 recession. These three plots convey a common
message: substantial loan losses incurred by banks together with the fall in their
equity prices typically cause large declines in banks’ net worth, which might lead to
persistent and mounting pressures on bank balance sheets, worsening the aggregate
credit conditions, and thus causing the observed decline in real economic activity,
which is much more pronounced in the Great Recession.
The middle left panel of Figure 1 plots commercial and industrial loan spreads
over federal funds rate (annualized). The figure shows that bank lending spreads
sky-rocketed in the recent crisis, reaching a 3.2% per annum towards the end of
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Figure 1.1: Financial Flows in the U.S. Economy
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to be over. The bottom left panel displays real bank credit growth rates (year-on-
year). The figure indicates that bank credit growth fell significantly in the recent
economic downturn. Taken together, these figures suggest that the U.S. economy
has experienced a significant deterioration in aggregate credit conditions as total
bank lending to non-financial sector declined sharply and the cost of funds for non-
financial firms increased substantially. Finally, the bottom right panel of Figure 1
plots real deposit growth rates (year-on-year). The figure shows that growth rate of
deposits began to fall substantially right after the recent recession.
Table 1.1: Business Cycle Properties of Real and Financial Variables, Quarterly U.S.
Data, 1987- 2010
Standard
Deviation xt−4 xt−3 xt−2 xt−1 xt xt+1 xt+2 xt+3 xt+4
Real Variables
Output 1.80 0.15 0.39 0.66 0.87 1.00 0.87 0.66 0.39 0.15
Consumption 0.45 -0.20 0.06 0.37 0.66 0.82 0.80 0.67 0.46 0.25
Investment 2.73 0.27 0.49 0.71 0.87 0.97 0.82 0.59 0.33 0.09
Hours 0.91 -0.01 0.19 0.43 0.65 0.83 0.89 0.83 0.68 0.44
Financial Variables
Bank credit 0.93 -0.20 -0.11 0.02 0.14 0.30 0.47 0.63 0.68 0.63
Deposits 0.69 -0.02 -0.08 -0.18 -0.30 -0.39 -0.42 -0.34 -0.22 -0.07
Net Worth 5.17 -0.15 -0.03 0.14 0.32 0.52 0.70 0.80 0.76 0.63
Leverage Ratio 5.61 0.16 0.05 -0.12 -0.30 -0.49 -0.66 -0.74 -0.70 -0.55
Loan Spread 0.08 0.05 0.04 -0.08 -0.21 -0.39 -0.42 -0.43 -0.32 -0.18
a Business cycle statistics in the table are based on HP-filtered cyclical components of quarterly empirical time
series (smoothing parameter:1600).
b The standard deviation of output is expressed in percent; standard deviations of the remaining variables are
normalized by the standard deviation of output (std(x)/std(GDP)).
c The correlation coefficients in bold font are the maximum ones in their respective rows.
d Data sources are provided in Appendix A.1.
I will assess the performance of the model below by its ability to match empiri-
cal cyclical properties of real and financial variables in the U.S data. Table 1 presents
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the business cycle properties of aggregate financial variables in U.S. commercial
banking sector together with standard macro aggregates for the period 1987-2010.12
The standard deviations of real and financial variables except GDP are relative to
the standard deviation of GDP. The correlation coefficients in bold font are the
maximum ones in their respective rows, which indicate the lead-lag relationship of
variables with output. The aggregate financial variables I consider are U.S. commer-
cial banks’ assets (bank credit), liabilities (deposits), net worth, leverage ratio and
loan spread.13 Quarterly seasonally-adjusted financial data are taken from the Fed-
eral Reserve Board. Quarterly real data are taken from Federal Reserve Economic
Data (FRED) of St. Louis FED. Financial data at the FED Board is nominal. GDP
deflator from NIPA accounts is used to deflate the financial time series. See the data
appendix for a more detailed description.
Table 1.1 gives us the following empirical facts about real and financial vari-
ables. Consumption and hours are less volatile than output, while investment is
more volatile; and consumption, investment, and hours are all strongly procyclical
with respect to output. These are standard business-cycle facts; for example, see
King and Rebelo (1999). Bank credit, deposits, and loan spread are less volatile than
output, while net worth and leverage ratio are nearly 5 times more volatile. Bank
12I focus on the period that begins in 1987 for two reasons. First, U.S. banking sector witnessed
a significant transformation starting from 1987 such as deregulation of deposit rates, increases in
financial flexibility. Second, it also corresponds to a structural break in the volatility of many
standard macro variables, which is so-called Great Moderation.
13I also conducted the same empirical exercise for total assets and total liabilities in addition
to the narrow definitions of these items here. The business cycle statistics are qualitatively very
similar although there are some negligible quantitative differences. The reason might be the fact
that bank credit constitutes a substantial part of total assets of a typical commercial bank and
deposits constitute a big portion of its total liabilities.
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assets and net worth are procyclical, while deposits, leverage ratio, and loan spread
are countercyclical. Finally, all financial variables lead the output fluctuations by
one to three quarters.14
Table 1.2: The Sequence of Events in a Given Time Period
1. Productivity zt and recovery rate ωt are realized.
2. Firms hire labor Ht and use capital Kt they purchased in period t− 1, which are used for production, Yt.
3. Firms make their wage payments wtHt and dividend payments to shareholders (banks) from period t-1.
4. Banks make their interest payments on deposits of households from period t-1 and bankers exit with prob. (1-θ).
5. Households make their consumption and saving decisions and deposit their resources at banks.
6. Firms sell their depreciated capital to capital producers who make investment and produce new capital Kt+1.
7. Firms issue shares [st = Kt+1] and sell these shares to banks to finance their capital expenditures.
8. Banks purchase firms’ shares and their incentive constraints bind.
9. Firms purchase capital Kt+1 from capital producers at the price of qt with borrowed funds.
1.3 A Business Cycle Model with Financial Sector
The model is an otherwise standard real business cycle model with a financial
sector. Market segmentation ensures that households cannot directly lend to final
good firms, which makes the financial sector essential for transferring funds from
households to non-financial firms. Credit frictions in financial sector are modeled as
in Gertler and Karadi (2011). I introduce shocks to bank net worth on top of the
standard productivity shocks. The model economy consists of four types of agents:
households, financial intermediaries, firms, and capital producers. The ability of
financial intermediaries to borrow from households is limited due to a moral hazard
(costly enforcement) problem, which will be described below. Firms acquire capital
in each period by selling shares to financial intermediaries. Finally, capital producers
14I also reproduce Table 1.1 for the period 1987:Q1-2007:Q1 in order to see whether the empirical
results are driven or at least substantially affected by the recent economic events starting at 2007:Q3
or not. The results show that the key stylized facts about real and financial variables described
above are robust to the sample period taken. The reproduced table can be found in Appendix A.1.
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are incorporated into the model in order to introduce capital adjustment costs in a
tractable way. Table 1.2 shows the sequence of events in a given time period in the
theoretical model described below. The section below will clarify this timeline.
1.3.1 Households
There is a continuum of identical households of measure unity. Households are




βtU(ct, 1 − Lt) (1.1)
Each household consumes and supplies labor to firms at the market clearing
real wage wt. In addition, they save by holding deposits at a riskless real return rt
at competitive financial intermediaries.
There are two types of members within each household: workers and bankers.
Workers supply labor and return the wages they earn to the household while each
banker administers a financial intermediary and transfers any earnings back to the
household. Hence, the household owns the financial intermediaries that its bankers
administer. However, the deposits that the household holds are put in financial in-
termediaries that it doesn’t own.15 Moreover, there is perfect consumption insurance
within each household.
At any point in time the fraction 1− ζ of the household members are workers
15This assumption ensures independent decision-making. Depositors are not the owners of the
bank, so the bankers don’t maximize the depositors’ utility, but the expected terminal net worth
of the banks that they own.
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and the remaining fraction ζ are bankers. An individual household member can
switch randomly between these two jobs over time. A banker this period remains a
banker next period with probability θ, which is independent of the banker’s history.
Therefore, the average survival time for a banker in any given period is 1/(1 − θ).
The bankers are not infinitely-lived in order to make sure that they don’t reach
a point where they can finance all equity investment from their own net worth.16
Hence, every period (1− θ)ζ bankers exit and become workers while the same mass
of workers randomly become bankers, keeping the relative proportion of workers and
bankers constant. Period t bankers learn about survival and exit at the beginning of
period t+ 1. Bankers who exit from the financial sector transfer their accumulated
earnings to their respective household. Furthermore, the household provides its new
bankers with some start-up funds.17
The household budget constraint is given by
ct + bt+1 = wtLt + (1 + rt)bt + Πt (1.2)
The household’s subjective discount factor is β ∈ (0,1), ct denotes the house-
hold’s consumption, bt+1 is the total amount of deposits that the household holds at
the financial intermediary, rt is the non-contingent real return on the deposits from
t−1 to t, wt is the real wage rate, and Πt is the profits to the household from owning
capital producers and banks net of the transfer that it gives to its new bankers plus
16This assumption ensures that the bankers have to borrow from households to finance their
equity purchases.
17This assumption ensures that banks don’t have zero net worth in any period and is similar to
the one about the entrepreneurial wage in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998), and Bernanke, Gertler,
and Gilchrist (1999).
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(minus) the amount of wealth redistributed from banks (households) to households
(banks) induced by the net worth shock.
The household chooses ct, Lt, and bt+1 to maximize (1.1) subject to the se-
quence of flow budget constraints in (1.2). The resulting first order conditions for




Uc(t) = β(1 + rt+1)EtUc(t+ 1) (1.4)
The condition (1.3) states that the marginal rate of substitution between con-
sumption and leisure is equal to the wage rate. The condition (1.4) is the standard
consumption-savings Euler equation, which equates the marginal cost of not con-




Financial intermediaries transfer the funds that they obtain from households
to firms. They acquire firm shares and finance these assets with household deposits
and their own equity. At the beginning of period t, before banks collect deposits,
an aggregate net worth shock hits banks’ balance sheets. Let’s denote ωt as the
15
time-varying recovery rate of loans as a percentage of bank net worth. Innovations
to ωt are shocks to bank net worth. Therefore, ωtñjt is the effective net worth of the
financial intermediary. For notational convenience, I denote ωtñjt by njt. Hence, njt
is the net worth of financial firm j at the beginning of period t after the net worth
shock hits. The balance sheet identity of financial intermediary j is then given by
qtsjt = bjt+1 + njt (1.5)
where qt is the price of a representative firm’s shares and sjt is the quantity of these
shares owned by bank j, bjt+1 is the amount of deposits that intermediary j obtains
from the households, njt is the net worth of financial firm j at the beginning of
period t after the net worth shock hits.18 Banks undertake equity investment and
firms finance their capital expenditures by issuing shares. Therefore, the financial
contract between the intermediary and the firm is an equity contract (or equivalently
a state-dependent debt contract).
The households put their deposits into the financial intermediary at time t and
obtain the non-contingent real return rt+1 at t+ 1. Therefore, bjt+1 is the liabilities
of the financial intermediary and njt is its equity or capital. The financial inter-
mediaries receive ex-post state-contingent return, rkt+1 for their equity investment.
The fact that rkt+1 is potentially greater than rt+1 creates an incentive for bankers
to engage in financial intermediation.
The financial intermediary’s net worth at the beginning of period t+ 1 (before
18In U.S. financial data, household deposits constitute 70% of total liabilities of banks. Boyd
(2007) also suggests that demand (checking) deposits form a substantial portion of bank liabilities.
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the time t+1 net worth shock hits) is given by the difference between the earnings on
equity investment in firms (assets of financial intermediary) and interest payments
on deposits obtained from the households (liabilities of financial intermediary). Thus
the law of motion for bank net worth is given by
ñjt+1 = (1 + rkt+1)qtsjt − (1 + rt+1)bjt+1 (1.6)
Using the balance sheet of the financial firm given by (1.5), we can re-write (1.6) as
follows:
ñjt+1 = (rkt+1 − rt+1)qtsjt + (1 + rt+1)njt (1.7)
The financial intermediary’s net worth at time t+1 depends on the premium (rkt+1−
rt+1) that it earns on shares purchased as well as the total value of these shares,
qtsjt.
1.3.2.2 Profit Maximization
This section describes banks’ profit maximization. The financial intermediary
j maximizes its expected discounted terminal net worth, Vjt, by choosing the amount








Since the expected discounted risk premium is positive in any period, the
financial intermediary will always have an incentive to buy firms’ shares. Obtaining
additional funds (deposits) from the households is the only way to achieve this.
However, an agency problem described below introduces an endogenous borrowing
constraint for banks, thus a limit on the size of the financial intermediaries: At
the end of the period, the financial intermediary may choose to divert λ fraction
of available funds from its shares of firms with no legal ramification and give them
to the household of which the banker is a member. If the financial intermediary
diverts the funds, the assumed legal structure ensures that depositors are able to
force the intermediary to go bankrupt and they may recover the remaining fraction
1 − λ of the assets. They are not able to get the remaining fraction λ of the funds
since, by assumption, the cost of recovering these funds is too high.19 Therefore,
for the banks not to have an incentive to divert the funds, the following incentive
compatibility constraint must be satisfied at the end of period t:
Vjt ≥ λqtsjt (1.9)
The left-hand side of (1.9) is the value of operating for the bank (or equiva-
lently cost of diverting funds) while the right-hand side is the gain from diverting λ
19As Christiano (2010) suggests, diverting funds is meant to say that bankers might not manage
funds in the interest of depositors or they might invest funds into risky projects which do not
earn a high return for depositors but a high excess return for bankers themselves (Bankers might
invest λ fraction of funds into very risky projects, which could potentially go bankrupt and reduce
equilibrium return to depositors). Taking this into consideration, depositors put their money at
banks up to a threshold level beyond which if bankers make risky investments, they do this at their
own risk. This threshold level of deposits can be thought as if deposits expand beyond that level,
banks would have an incentive to default. The market discipline prevents deposits from expanding
beyond the default threshold level and interest rate spreads reflect this fear of default although
defaults are not observed in equilibrium.
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fraction of assets. The intuition for this constraint is that in order for the financial
intermediary not to divert the funds and for the households to put their deposits
into the bank, the value of operating in financial sector must be greater than or
equal to the gain from diverting assets and going bankrupt.20
A financial intermediary’s objective is to maximize the expected return to its
portfolio consisting of firms’ shares and its capital subject to the incentive compat-
ibility constraint. Then its demand for shares is fully determined by its net worth
position, since as long as the expected return from the portfolio is strictly positive,
it will expand its lending (its size) until the incentive compatibility constraint binds.
1.3.2.3 Leverage Ratio and Net Worth Evolution
Proposition 1 The expected discounted terminal net worth of a bank can be ex-
pressed as the sum of expected discounted total return to its equity investment into
firms and expected discounted total return to its existing net worth.
Proof : See Appendix A.2.1.
Proposition 1 states that that Vjt can be expressed as follows:
Vjt = νtqtsjt + ηtnjt (1.10)
where
20In equilibrium, given the incentive compatibility constraint binds, the banker is indifferent
between diverting funds and not diverting them. Here we focus on the equilibrium where banker
chooses to operate in the financial sector rather than diverting money and going bankrupt. There-
fore, we analyze the equilibrium where there are no defaults of banks and the amount of funds
that the bankers can collect from households endogenously depends on bankers’ own net worth.
19








νt can be interpreted as the expected discounted marginal gain to the bank of
buying one more unit of firms’ shares, holding its net worth njt constant. The first
term is the discounted value of the net return on shares to the bank if it exits the
financial sector tomorrow. The second term is the continuation value of its increased
assets if it survives. Meanwhile, ηt can be interpreted as the expected discounted
marginal benefit of having one more unit of net worth, holding qtsjt constant. The
first term is the discounted value of the return on net worth to the bank if it exits
the financial sector tomorrow. The second term is the continuation value of its
increased net worth if it survives.
Therefore, we can write the incentive compatibility constraint as follows:
νtqtsjt + ηtnjt ≥ λqtsjt (1.13)
The incentive compatibility constraint above binds as long as 0 < νt < λ. The
intuition is as follows: Assume that νt ≥ λ. Then the left-hand side of (1.13) is
always greater than the right-hand side of (1.13) since ηtnjt > 0 as can be seen
from (1.12). The franchise value of the bank is always higher than the gain from
diverting funds. Therefore, the constraint is always slack. Moreover, assume that
20
νt ≤ 0. Since νt is the expected discounted marginal gain to the bank of increasing
its assets, the intermediary does not have the incentive to expand its assets when
νt ≤ 0. In this case, the constraint does not bind because the intermediary does not
collect any deposits from households.
The profits of the financial intermediary will be affected by the premium rkt+1−
rt+1 . That is, the banker will not have any incentive to buy firms’ shares if the
discounted return on these shares is less than the discounted cost of deposits. Thus
the financial firm will continue to operate in period t+ i if the following inequality
is satisfied:
Et+iβΛt,t+1+i(rkt+1+i − rt+1+i) ≥ 0 ∀i ≥ 0 (1.14)
where βΛt,t+1+i is the stochastic discount factor that the financial firm applies to
its earnings at t+ 1 + i. The moral hazard problem between households and banks
described above limits banks’ ability to obtain deposits from the households, leading
to a positive premium. The following proposition establishes this fact.
Proposition 2 Risk premium is positive as long as the incentive compatibility con-
straint binds.
Proof : See Appendix A.2.2.
When this constraint binds, the financial intermediary’s assets are limited by
its net worth. That is, if this constraint binds, the funds that the intermediary can






The constraint (1.15) limits the leverage of the financial intermediary to the
point where its incentive to divert funds is exactly balanced by its loss from doing so.
Thus, the costly enforcement problem leads to an endogenous borrowing constraint
on the bank’s ability to acquire assets. When bank’s leverage ratio and/or bank
equity is high, it can extend more credit to non-financial firms. Conversely, de-
leveraging or the deterioration in net worth in bad times will limit the bank’s ability
to extend credit. Note that by manipulating this expression using the balance sheet,







The leverage ratio increases in the expected marginal benefit of buying one
more unit of firm share, and in the expected marginal gain of having one more unit
of net worth. Intuitively, increases in ηt or νt mean that financial intermediation is
expected to be more lucrative going forward, which makes it less attractive to divert
funds today and thus increases the amount of funds depositors are willing to entrust
to the financial intermediary.21
21The amount of deposits at banks does directly depend on banks’ net worth. In good times
banks’ net worth is relatively high and depositors believe that bankers do not misbehave in terms
of managing their funds properly. In these times, credit spreads can be fully explained by observed
bankruptcies and intermediation costs. However, in bad times, banks experience substantial de-
clines in their net worth and depositors are hesitant about putting their money in banks. In these
times, the financial sector operates at a less efficient level and a smaller number of investment
projects are funded. Large credit spread observed in these times can be explained by the above
factors plus the inefficiency in the banking system.
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Using (1.15), I can re-write the law of motion for the banker’s net worth as
follows:
ñjt+1 = [(rkt+1 − rt+1)
ηt
λ− νt
+ (1 + rt+1)]njt (1.17)
The sensitivity of net worth of the financial intermediary j at t + 1 to the
ex-post realization of the premium rkt+1 − rt+1 increases in the leverage ratio.
Proposition 3 Banks have an identical leverage ratio as none of its components
depends on bank-specific factors.
Proof : From (1.17), one can obtain the following:
ñjt+1
njt
= [(rkt+1 − rt+1)
ηt
λ− νt











The expressions above show that banks have identical expected growth rates
of assets and net worth, thus have identical leverage ratios.22
By using Proposition 4, we can sum demand for assets across j to obtain the





22This immediately implies that ηt and νt are independent of j. In Appendix A.2.1, I use this
result in explicit derivation of ηt and νt.
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where st is the aggregate amount of assets held by financial intermediaries and nt
is the aggregate intermediary net worth. In the equilibrium of the model, move-
ments in the leverage ratio of financial firms and/or in their net worth will generate
fluctuations in total intermediary assets.
The aggregate intermediary net worth at the beginning of period t+ 1 (before
the net worth shock hits but after exit and entry), ñt+1, is the sum of the net worth
of surviving financial intermediaries from the previous period, ñet+1, and the net
worth of entering financial intermediaries, ñnt+1. Thus, we have
ñt+1 = ñet+1 + ñnt+1 (1.21)
Since the fraction θ of the financial intermediaries at time t will survive until
time t + 1, their net worth, ñet+1, is given by
ñet+1 = θ[(rkt+1 − rt+1)
ηt
λ− νt
+ (1 + rt+1)]nt (1.22)
Newly entering financial intermediaries receive start-up funds from their re-
spective households. The start-up funds are assumed to be a transfer equal to a
fraction of the net worth of exiting bankers.23 The total final period net worth of
exiting bankers at time t is equal to (1−θ)nt. The household is assumed to transfer
the fraction ǫ
(1−θ)
of the total final period net worth to its newly entering financial
intermediaries. Therefore, we have
23This assumption is slightly different from that in Gertler&Karadi (2011). They assume that
the net worth of newly entering bankers is a fraction of banks’ total assets rather than its net
worth. Since the fraction is small, it does not change the main results of the study significantly.
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ñnt+1 = ǫnt (1.23)
Using (1.21), (1.22), and (1.23), we obtain the following law of motion for ñt+1:
ñt+1 = θ[(rkt+1 − rt+1)
ηt
λ− νt
+ (1 + rt+1)]nt + ǫnt (1.24)
1.3.3 Firms
There is a continuum of unit mass of firms that produce the final output in the
economy. The production technology at time t is described by a constant returns
to scale Cobb-Douglas production function:





where Kt is the firm’s capital stock, Ht is the firm’s hiring of labor and zt is an
aggregate TFP realization.
Firms acquire capital Kt+1 at the end of period t to produce the final output
in the next period. After producing at time t + 1, the firm can sell the capital on
the open market.
Firms finance their capital expenditures in each period by issuing equities and
selling them to financial intermediaries. Firms issue st units of state-contingent
claims (equity), which is equal to the number of units of capital acquired Kt+1. The
financial contract between a financial intermediary and a firm is an equity contract
(or equivalently, a state contingent debt contract). The firm pays a state-contingent
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interest rate equal to the ex-post return on capital rkt+1 to the financial intermedi-
ary. The firms set their capital demand Kt+1 taking this stochastic repayment into
consideration. At the beginning of period t + 1 (after shocks are realized), when
output becomes available, firms obtain resources Yt+1 and use them to make repay-
ments to shareholders (or financial intermediaries). The firm prices each financial
claim at the price of a unit of capital, qt. Thus, we have
qtst = qtKt+1 (1.26)
There are no frictions for firms in obtaining funds from financial intermediaries.
The bank has perfect information about the firm and there is perfect enforcement.
Therefore, in the current model, only banks face endogenous borrowing constraints
in obtaining funds. These constraints directly affect the supply of funds to the firms.
Firms choose the labor demand at time t as follows:
wt = ztFH(Kt, Ht) (1.27)
Then firms pay out the ex-post return to capital to the banks given that they
earn zero profit state by state. Therefore, ex-post return to capital is given by
rkt+1 =
zt+1FK(Kt+1, Ht+1) + qt+1(1 − δ)
qt
− 1 (1.28)
Labor demand condition (1.27) simply states that the wage rate is equal to
the marginal product of labor. Moreover, condition (1.28) states that the ex-post
26
real rate of return on capital is equal to the marginal product of capital plus the
capital gain from changed asset prices.
1.3.4 Capital Producers
Following the literature on financial accelerator, I incorporate capital produc-
ers into the model in order to introduce capital adjustment costs in a tractable way.
Capital adjustment costs are needed to introduce variation in the price of capital;
otherwise the price of capital will not respond to the changes in capital stock and
will always be equal to 1.24
I assume that households own capital producers and receive any profits. At
the end of period t, competitive capital producers buy capital from firms to repair
the depreciated capital and to build new capital. Then they sell both the new and
repaired capital. The cost of replacing the depreciated capital is unity; thus the
price of a unit of new capital or repaired capital is qt. The profit maximization
problem of the capital producers is given by:
max
It
qtKt+1 − qt(1 − δ)Kt − It (1.29)












24There will be no financial accelerator between households and banks if there is no variation
in the price of capital.
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is the partial derivative of the capital adjustment cost function with
respect to investment-capital ratio at time t. The fluctuations in investment expen-
ditures will create variation in the price of capital. A fall in investment at time t
(ceteris paribus) will reduce the price of capital in the same period.
1.3.5 Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium of this model economy consists of sequences of allo-
cations {ct, Lt, Kt+1, st, nt, ñt, It, ηt, νt, Ht}
∞
t=0, of prices {wt, rkt+1, rt+1, qt}
∞
t=0 and of
exogenous processes {zt, ωt}
∞
t=0 such that (i) the allocations solve the household’s,
the financial intermediary’s, the firm’s and the capital producer’s problems at the
equilibrium prices and (ii) markets for factor inputs clear. The following equilibrium




Uc(t) = β(1 + rt+1)EtUc(t+ 1) (1.33)
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rkt+1 =
zt+1FK(Kt+1, Ht+1) + qt+1(1 − δ)
qt
− 1 (1.34)
wt = ztFH(Kt, Ht) (1.35)













ñt+1 = θ[(rkt+1 − rt+1)
ηt
λ− νt
+ (1 + rt+1)]nt + ǫnt (1.40)
qtst = qtKt+1 (1.41)
















Lt = Ht (1.44)
Ct + It = ztF (Kt, Ht) (1.45)
log(zt+1) = ρzlog(zt) + ǫ
z
t+1 (1.46)




This section studies the quantitative predictions of the model by examining
the results of numerical simulations of an economy calibrated to quarterly U.S.
data. In order to investigate the dynamics of the model, I compute a second-order
approximation to the equilibrium conditions using Dynare.
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1.4.1 Functional Forms, Parametrization and Calibration
The quantitative analysis uses the following functional forms for preferences,
production technology and capital adjustment costs:25
U(c, 1 − L) = log(c) + υlog(1 − L) (1.48)


















Table 1.3 lists the parameter values for the model economy. The preference
and production parameters are standard in business cycle literature. I take the
quarterly discount factor, β as 0.9942 to match the 2.37% average annualized real
deposit rate in the U.S. for the period 1987.Q1-2010.Q4. I pick the relative utility
weight of labor υ as 1.72 to fix hours worked in steady state, L, at one third of
the available time. The share of capital in the production function is set to 0.36
to match the labor share of income in the U.S. data. The capital adjustment cost
parameter is taken so as to match the relative volatility of price of investment goods
with respect to output in the U.S. data.26 The quarterly depreciation rate of capital
is set to 2.25% to match the average annual investment to capital ratio.
25I choose the functional form of the capital adjustment cost following Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist (1999), Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2007).
26The volatility of price of investment goods is taken from Gomme et al. (2011).
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Table 1.3: Model Parameterization and Calibration
Description Parameter Value Target Data
Preferences
Quarterly discount factor β 0.9942 Annualized real deposit rate 2.37%
Relative utility weight of leisure υ 1.7167 Hours worked 0.3333
Production Technology
Share of capital in output α 0.36 Labor share of output 0.64
Capital adjustment cost parameter ϕ 3.6 Relative volatility of price of investment 0.37
Depreciation rate of capital δ 0.025 Average annual ratio of investment to capital 10%
Steady-state total factor productivity z 1 Normalization N/A
Financial Intermediaries
Steady-state fraction of assets that can be diverted λ 0.1548 Commercial and industrial loan spread 0.46%
Proportional transfer to the entering bankers ǫ 0.001 0.1% of aggregate net worth N/A
Survival probability of the bankers θ 0.9685 Leverage ratio of commercial banks 4.62
Steady-state level of net worth shock ω 1 Normalization N/A
Shock Processes
Persistence of TFP process ρz 0.9315 Quarterly persistence of TFP process 0.9315
Standard deviation of productivity shock σz 0.006424 Quarterly standard dev. of TFP shock 0.0064
Persistence of ω process ρω 0.3744 Quarterly persistence of ω process 0.3744
Standard deviation of net worth shock σω 0.0512 Quarterly standard dev. of net worth shock 0.0512
The non-standard parameters in our model are the financial sector parame-
ters: the fraction of the revenues that can be diverted, λ, the proportional transfer
to newly entering bankers, ǫ, and the survival probability of bankers, θ. I set ǫ to
0.001 so that the proportional transfer to newly entering bankers is 0.1% of aggre-
gate net worth.27 I pick other two parameters simultaneously to match the following
two targets: an average interest rate spread of 46 basis points, which is the histor-
ical average of the difference between the quarterly commercial and industrial loan
spread and the quarterly deposit rate from 1987.Q1 to 2010.Q4, and an average
leverage ratio of 4.61, which is the historical average of U.S. commercial banks’
leverage ratio for the same period. The resulting values for λ and θ are 0.155 and
0.968, respectively.
Finally, turning to the shock processes, I follow the standard Solow residuals
approach to construct the series for productivity shocks.28 Using the production
27I keep the proportional transfer to newly entering bankers small, so that it does not have
significant impact on the results.
28I also perform model-based simulations of macro-financial shocks using utilization-adjusted









Using the empirical series for output, yt, capital, Kt, and labor, Ht, I use equation
(1.51) to obtain the zt series. Then I construct the log-deviation of TFP series by
linearly detrending the log of the zt series over the period 1987.Q1-2010.Q4.
Similar to the construction of productivity shocks, ωt series are constructed










Using the empirical series for net worth, nt, credit spread, rkt+1 − rt+1, leverage,
ηt
λ−νt
, and gross deposit rate 1 + rt+1, I use equation (1.52) obtain the ωt series.
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Then I construct the log-deviation of ωt series by linearly detrending the log of these
series over the period 1987.Q1-2010.Q4. The innovations to ωt are net worth shocks.
After constructing the zt and ωt series over the period 1987.Q1-2010.Q4, I
estimate two independent AR(1) processes for both series:30
log(zt+1) = ρzlog(zt) + ǫ
z
t+1 (1.53)
29I constructed two ωt series by using the realized and the expected values of credit spread. I
obtain the expected value of credit spread by regressing actual spread on real and financial variables
(such as GDP, consumption, investment, hours, bank credit, deposits, net worth) and getting the
predicted value of it. Both series of ω are very similar to each other (the correlation between the
two series is 0.9934).
30For the stochastic processes, I also tried fitting a VAR(1), however, the cross-terms in VAR(1)
are statistically insignificant at 5% significance level. I included the main results of the analysis
under the VAR(1) representation into the Appendix A.4. The results are qualitatively very similar
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Figure 1.2: Time Series of Shocks to Productivity and Credit Conditions
log(ωt+1) = ρωlog(ωt) + ǫ
ω
t+1 (1.54)
where ǫz,t+1 and ǫω,t+1 are i.i.d. with standard deviations σz and σω, respectively.
The resulting parameters are ρz = 0.93, ρω = 0.37, σz = 0.0064, and σω = 0.05.
The first two panels of Figure 1.2 plot the variables zt and ωt constructed using
the procedures described above. The figures show that the levels of productivity
and credit conditions fell sharply in the recent recession.31 The bottom panels
31The level of ωt started to decline before the recession officially began. However, we see a
sharp increase in the level of ωt in the middle of the recession period due to the fact that there
are huge capital transfers from bank holding companies to their commercial banks and injection
of capital from the FED with the capital purchase program. If we remove this spike due to the
capital transfers, we see a decline in the level of ωt before the recession starts.
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plot the innovations ǫz,t and ǫω,t. These innovations are unexpected changes in the
levels of productivity and financial conditions. The plots suggest that the U.S.
economy is severely hit by both negative productivity and financial shocks in the
Great Recession.
1.4.2 Long-Run Equilibrium of the Model
This section presents the deterministic steady-state properties of the model
economy. First, I will formally show how the tightness of bank capital constraint
affects output. Imposing the steady-state on the competitive equilibrium conditions
















where µ is the Lagrange multiplier of bank capital constraint. Taking the partial
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which unambiguously shows that the output will be lower the larger µ. The reason is
simple. As the bank capital constraint gets tighter, the credit spread will be larger,
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as can be seen from the following expression.
(rk − r) =
(1 − βθ)µλ
(1 − θ)β(1 + µ)
(1.57)
The term at the right-hand side of equation (1.57) appears as a positive wedge
in the intertemporal Euler equation, which determines how deposits (savings) are
transformed into credit to firms in the economy. This positive wedge reduces the
amount of savings that can be extended as credit to non-financial firms, lowering
their physical capital accumulation, and thus leading to a lower steady-state output.
The same mechanism is also at work when shocks move the economy around the
steady-state as they tighten or relax the bank capital constraint.

























































Figure 1.3: Long-run equilibrium as a function of fraction of diverted funds by
bankers
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Second, I analytically show how output is affected by the severity of credit
frictions in banking sector, which is governed by the fraction of diverted funds by























(1 − βθ)[(1 − ǫ)β − θ]λ
(1 − θ)β(1 − ǫ)β
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which implies that the steady-state output will be lower the higher the intensity
of financial frictions in banking sector. In order to get the intuition behind this
result, I display long-run equilibria of real and financial variables as a function of
the intensity of the credit friction in the financial sector given by fraction of diverted
funds by bankers, λ. All other parameter values are set to those shown in Table 1.3.
Figure 1.3 shows that the long-run dynamics of the model economy to changes in λ
is monotonic and non-linear. As λ increases, households’ incentive to make deposits
into banks falls since the bankers’ gain from diverting funds rises. Banks have to
finance their equity investment by internal financing rather than external financing.
Thus, deposits go down and net worth rises, leading to a fall in banks’ leverage ratio.
The decline in leverage ratio is sharper than the rise in net worth, inducing a drop
in total credit to non-financial firms. Credit conditions tighten for firms and their
cost of funds given by credit spread goes up. This leads to a reduction in investment
and output falls.
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1.4.3 Intermediary Capital and the Transmission of Shocks
I present the dynamics of the model in response to productivity and net worth
shocks. In the figures below, credit spread, return to capital, and deposit rate are
expressed in percentage points per annum. The responses of all other variables are
expressed in percentage deviations from their respective steady state values.
1.4.3.1 Impulse Responses to TFP Shocks
Figure 1.4 presents the impulse responses to a one-time, one-standard devi-
ation negative shock to TFP. The negative technology shock reduces the price of
investment goods produced by capital producers by 0.3% on impact, lowering the
value of firms’ shares. This makes purchase of their shares less profitable for banks,
which can also be observed from the 1.2% fall in the return to capital. Thus, banks
have difficulty in obtaining deposits from households since their equity investment
becomes less attractive. This reduces the return to deposits by 0.2%, inducing a
countercyclical credit spread. The spread rises by 0.3% on impact. In order to
compensate the fall in their external financing, banks need to finance a larger share
of their purchases of equities from their net worth. However, bank net worth also
falls by 4% due to lower asset prices. Since the decline in net worth is sharper
than the fall in deposits on impact, banks’ leverage ratio rises. Hence, the model
with productivity shocks generates a countercyclical leverage ratio. Because banks
cannot adjust their net worth immediately and the lower price of capital reduces
the value of their net worth, their financing conditions tighten and bank lending in
38
the form of equity purchases falls dramatically (by about 4.6%), inducing aggregate
investment to shrink by 0.9%. Finally, hours fall by 0.15%, and output declines by
1.2%.
39

































































































































Bank Capital to Asset Ratio
Figure 1.4: Impulse responses to a negative one-standard-deviation productivity shock
40



































































Household Deposits (Bank Liabilities)























































Bank Capital to Asset Ratio
Figure 1.5: Impulse responses to a negative one-standard-deviation net worth shock
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1.4.3.2 Impulse Responses to Financial Shocks
Figure 1.5 presents the impulse responses to a one-time, one-standard devia-
tion negative shock to net worth. The negative net worth shock immediately reduces
net worth of banks. Bank net worth falls roughly by 15% on impact. In order to
compensate the decline in their internal financing, they need to finance a larger share
of their purchases of equities from deposits. This induces a rise in their leverage
ratio. Hence, the model driven by net worth shocks also generates a countercycli-
cal leverage ratio. Although they have to finance a greater fraction of their equity
investment from deposits, their ability to do so is impaired by the fall in their net
worth, leading deposits to decline after five quarters. Moreover, the fall in their
net worth translates into a reduction in bank credit to firms. Bank credit shrinks
by roughly 8% on impact. Since firms finance their capital expenditures via bank
credit, they cut back their investment severely (by about 2%). The drop in invest-
ment reduces the price of capital by 0.4%, which lowers banks’ net worth further.
Hours fall by 0.4% and output drops by 0.9% on impact. Finally, consumption rises
on impact after the shock hits, which is what was observed at the beginning of the
recent financial crisis. In the context of the model, this seemingly unappealing re-
sult can be explained as follows: On the intratemporal margin, the fall in aggregate
demand caused by lower investment expenditures translates into a reduction in the
demand for labor, which eventually leads to a drop in hours worked. Since wages
are flexible, the reduction in labor demand also lowers wages, leading to a fall in
households’ wage bill. However, the rise in credit spread on impact raises banks’
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profits. Since households own banks, the rise in their profits helps households sus-
tain their consumption after the financial shock hits. On impact, the rise in bank
profits dominates the reduction in wage bill, pushing consumption up.32
1.4.4 Business Cycle Dynamics
This section presents numerical results from stochastic simulations of the
benchmark economy with productivity and net worth shocks. First, I simulate the
model economy 1000 times for 1096 periods each and discard the first 1000 periods
in each simulation so that each simulation has the same length as the data sample.
I then compute the standard business cycle statistics using the cyclical components
of the HP-filtered series. I also conduct the same quantitative exercise for the fric-
tionless version of the benchmark economy, which is essentially the standard RBC
model with capital adjustment costs, in order to compare the real fluctuations in
both models. Finally, I simulate the model economy only driven by productivity
shocks to see the contribution of net worth shocks to the observed dynamics of real
and financial variables.
Table 1.4 presents quarterly real and financial statistics in the data and in
the model economies. In particular, it displays the relative standard deviations
of real and financial variables with respect to output and their cross-correlations
with output. Column 3 of the table shows that the standard RBC model with
capital adjustment costs driven by standard productivity shocks is able produce
32Barro and King (1984) argue that any shock that reduces the quantity of hours worked on
impact has to lead a fall in consumption due to consumption-leisure optimality condition. Ajello
(2010) shows that sticky wages are the key factor in generating a positive comovement between
consumption and investment after a financial shock.
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the key business cycle facts in the U.S. data as expected: consumption and hours
less volatile than output, while investment is more volatile, all real variables are
highly procyclical. However, this model can only explain 80% of the fluctuations in
output and less than half of the relative volatility in hours. It also generates roughly
perfect positive correlation between real variables and output, contrary to the data.
Moreover, this model has no predictions about financial variables.
Column 4 of the table shows the business cycle statistics of our model economy
with only productivity shocks. This model is much closer to the data in terms of
real fluctuations, compared to the RBC model. It now accounts for 85% of the
fluctuations in output and roughly half of the relative volatility in hours. The
model is also able to replicate most of the stylized facts about financial variables:
bank assets, deposits and loan spread is less volatile than output, while net worth
and leverage ratio are more volatile; bank assets and net worth are procyclical, while
leverage ratio and loan spread are countercyclical. However, it generates procyclical
deposits, contrary to the data. Although the model does a good job in terms of key
facts of financial variables, it predicts lower fluctuations. For example, it can explain
less than half of the relative volatility in bank assets, roughly half of the relative
volatility in deposits, less than one third of the relative volatility in net worth and
leverage ratio. The model virtually matches the relative volatility of credit spread.
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Table 1.4: Real and Financial Statistics
Statistic Data RBC Only Productivity Benchmark
σY 1.80 1.44 1.53 1.81
σC 0.45 0.41 0.39 0.75
σI 2.73 2.45 2.98 4.64
σL 0.91 0.40 0.46 0.84
ρY,I 0.97 1.00 0.98 0.87
ρY,C 0.82 0.97 0.85 -0.03
ρY,L 0.83 0.99 0.96 0.81
σAssets 0.93 – 0.40 0.58
σDeposits 0.69 – 0.39 0.87
σNetWorth 5.17 – 1.36 5.90
σLeverageR. 5.61 – 1.40 6.40
σSpread 0.08 – 0.07 0.23
ρY,Assets 0.30 – 0.90 0.88
ρY,Deposits -0.39 – 0.46 -0.23
ρY,NetWorth 0.52 – 0.87 0.68
ρY,LeverageR. -0.49 – -0.71 -0.59
ρY,Spread -0.39 – -0.86 -0.67
a Business cycle statistics in the table are based on HP-filtered cyclical components of quarterly simulated time
series (smoothing parameter:1600).
b The standard deviation of output is expressed in percent; standard deviations of the remaining variables are
normalized by the standard deviation of output (std(x)/std(GDP)).
c In all model economies, capital adjustment cost parameter is set to 3.3, which is calibrated in benchmark model
to match the relative volatility of price of investment.
Column 5 of the table shows the real and financial statistics in the benchmark
economy driven by both shocks. This model is even closer to the data than the
previous model in terms of business cycle properties of real variables. It predicts all
of the fluctuations in output, almost all of the relative volatility in hours. The cross
correlations of investment and hours with output are quite inline with the data.
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However, the model generates acyclical consumption due to the reasons explained
in the previous section. This model has better predictions about financial variables.
It is able to reproduce the key facts about aggregate financial variables. Moreover, it
now explains more than half of the relative volatility in bank assets, and somewhat
overpredicts the relative volatility in other financial variables. The last column of
Table 1 establishes the first main result of the first chapter: the benchmark model
driven by both shocks is able to deliver most of the key stylized facts about real and
financial variables simultaneously.
1.5 Model-Based Simulations of Macro-Financial Shocks vs. U.S.
Data
I also study the dynamics of the model in response to the actual sequence
of shocks to see whether the model is able to generate the real and financial cycles
observed in the U.S. data.33 I feed the actual innovations to zt and ωt into the model
and compute the responses of real and financial variables over the period 1987 to
2010.
Figure 1.6 displays the quarterly time series of output, investment and hours
in the data, in the standard RBC model with capital adjustment costs, and in the
benchmark economy. The RBC model is driven by standard productivity shocks,
while the benchmark model is driven by both shocks. Both the quarterly times se-
33Although I feed the actual series of shocks into the model, they are not perfectly anticipated
by the agents in the economy as they predict future values of zt and ωt using the AR(1) processes
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Figure 1.6: Real Fluctuations: Benchmark vs. RBC model
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ries of the variables and their model counterparts are log-linearly detrended over the
period 1987.Q1 - 2010.Q4, and plotted in percentage deviations from their trends.
The correlations between the actual and the model-simulated series are also reported
in the graphs. The figure suggests that both the RBC model and the benchmark
economy generate series of real variables that closely follow their empirical coun-
terparts. However, the RBC model predicts lower fluctuations in all real variables.
In particular, the RBC model predicts a smaller decline in output in the 1990-91
recession. Moreover, it generates declines in investment and hours that are smaller
than the actual declines in the 1990-91 and 2007-09 recessions. On the other hand,
the benchmark model generates larger fluctuations in real variables, consistent with
the data. Since this model has one additional shock compared to the RBC model,
higher volatility can be expected. However, the benchmark model also improves
upon the RBC model in the sense that for output, investment and hours, the cross-
correlations between the data and the benchmark model is much higher than those
between the data and the RBC model. Moreover, the model’s success in generating
empirically-relevant fluctuations in hours hinges on the fact that it is able to produce
quantitatively reasonable fluctuations in capital. Since labor is complementary to
capital stock in a standard Cobb-Douglas production function, empirically-relevant
changes in capital stock lead to observed fluctuations in hours. The second dimen-
sion that the benchmark model improves upon the RBC model is that the latter has
no predictions about financial variables by construction while the former generates
movements in financial variables consistent with the U.S. financial data.
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Figure 1.8: Real Fluctuations: RBC vs. Only Productivity
in the data, in the model driven only by productivity shocks, and in the benchmark
economy. The figure suggests that the benchmark economy performs better than
the model with only productivity shocks in terms of both volatilities of real variables
and cross-correlations of those variables with the data. For all the real variables,
the cross-correlations with the data in the benchmark model is higher than those
with the data in the model with only productivity shocks.
Figure 1.8 displays the quarterly time series of output, investment and hours
in the data, in the RBC model, and in the model driven only by productivity
shocks. This figure suggests that the model with only productivity shocks is not
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very different from the RBC model in terms of its quantitative performance in real
variables. Actually, the series of real variables generated by these two models are
almost the same. Therefore, we can say that credit frictions in banking sector
by themselves are not enough to improve upon the RBC model and to produce
real fluctuations consistent with the data. Financial shocks are quite important in
explaining the observed dynamics of real variables.
Figure 1.9 shows the quarterly time series of bank credit, deposits, net worth,
leverage ratio, and credit spread both in the data, in the model driven only by
productivity shocks and in the benchmark model. Both the quarterly time series of
financial variables and their model counterparts are log-linearly detrended over the
period 1987.Q1 - 2010.Q4, and plotted in percentage deviations from their trends.
Credit spread is plotted in annualized percentages. The correlations between the
actual and the model-simulated series are also reported in the graphs. For all the
financial variables, the cross-correlations with the data in the benchmark model is
significantly higher than those with the data in the model with only productivity
shocks. Specifically, for net worth, leverage ratio and credit spread, the benchmark
model produces highly positively correlated series with the data, while the model
with only productivity shocks predicts negative correlations. Thus, figures 1.7 and
1.9 establish the second main result of the chapter that financial shocks contribute
significantly to explaining the observed dynamics of financial variables.
Figure 1.10 plots the fluctuations in the Lagrange multiplier of bank capital
constraint in the benchmark model and those in the index of credit tightness con-
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Figure 1.10: Tightness of Credit Conditions in the Benchmark Model
on Bank Lending Practices. Starting with the second quarter of 1990, this sur-
vey basically asks senior loan officers whether they have recently tighten the credit
standards for commercial and industrial loans, and the collected responses are used
to create an index of credit tightness as the percentage of respondents, reporting
tightening standards. Increases in both the multiplier and the index show the ad-
verse changes in bank lending to non-financial businesses. The figure shows that
the multiplier tracks the index well. The multiplier also explains the severity of
credit conditions experienced by the U.S. economy in the last three recessions by
capturing most of the fluctuations in the index. However, there seems to be a phase
shift between these two series.34 There might be two reasons behind this. The first
one is the inability of standard RBC models to match the lead-lag relationships of
macro variables. The second one is using lagging financial variables from H.8 tables
34If I use loan losses data to construct the financial shock series, there is no phase shift in the
tightness of credit conditions.
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while constructing financial shocks rather than using leading financial variables from
Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (Call) Reports. Bearing this caveat
in mind, we can say that figure 1.10 establishes the third main result of this chapter:
U.S. banks experienced a significant deterioration in their lending ability in the last
recessions, especially in 1990-91 and 2007-09 recessions.
1.6 Conclusion
This study quantitatively investigates the joint role of financial shocks and
credit frictions affecting banking sector in driving the real and financial fluctuations
in the U.S. data. To this end, I first characterize the empirical cyclical behavior of
aggregate financial variables of U.S. banking sector. I then use an otherwise standard
real business cycle model with a financial sector, which features an agency problem
between banks and their depositors, leading to endogenous borrowing constraints
for banks in obtaining funds from households. I incorporate empirically-disciplined
shocks to bank net worth (i.e. “financial shocks”) which affect the ability of banks
to obtain funds from households and to extend credit to non-financial sector.The
time series of financial shocks are constructed from the data. The resulting shock
series show that credit conditions in the U.S. economy deteriorated significantly in
the recent recession.
Several key findings emerge from the quantitative analysis. First, the bench-
mark model driven by both productivity and financial shocks is able to explain
most of the empirical facts about real and financial variables simultaneously. Sec-
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ond, financial shocks to banking sector contribute significantly not only to the ob-
served dynamics of aggregate financial variables but also to the observed dynam-
ics of standard macroeconomic variables. In particular, the benchmark model has
better predictions about real and financial variables than the model driven only
by productivity shocks. Third, the simulation of the benchmark model points a
significant worsening in banks’ lending ability in 1990-91 and 2007-09 recessions.
The main transmission mechanism of financial shocks is through bank capital chan-
nel. In particular, financial shocks are transmitted to the real economy through
tightening bank capital constraint, which eventually leads to rising credit spread.
Non-financial firms perceive this rise in credit spread as an increase in their cost of
borrowing from banks, leading to a decline in their external finance for investment
expenditures. Falling aggregate demand caused by lower investment reduces the
demand for labor, which brings a drop in hours worked, and hence output.
For further research, one can investigate the normative implications of the
model in the light of the recent financial crisis, as U.S. government has assisted
many financial firms in order to raise their franchise value, and hence to support
real economic activity. In order to start thinking about how different policy tools
can be implemented in an environment in which the financial sector is crucial for
business cycle fluctuations and what the welfare implications of these policies are,
we need a model capable of matching real and financial fluctuations simultaneously.
We think that the model proposed in this study is quite successful in this dimension.
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Chapter 2
Required Reserves as a Credit Policy Tool
(joint with Enes Sunel and Temel Taşkın)
2.1 Introduction
Policymakers in both advanced and emerging countries have been exercising
a variety of measures to mitigate the transmission of financial disruptions to the
real sector. To that end, frictions in the financial sector and macroprudential policy
instruments have been the focal point of the recent literature on macroeconomic
dynamics and policy. Among many, reserve requirements have been used extensively
as a macroprudential policy tool in several emerging countries, recently. China,
Brazil, Malaysia, Peru, Colombia and Turkey are some of the countries among others
who have used this tool mostly to curb excessive credit growth in upturns along with
other reasons.1 In terms of their main objectives, they employ reserve requirements
either as a monetary policy tool to achieve price stability or as a macroprudential
policy tool to foster financial stability, or both. For example, the Central Bank
of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT, hereafter) regards the interest rate as the main
policy tool for price stability, with a secondary role for financial stability, and reserve
requirements as the main policy tool for financial stability, with a secondary role
1See Montoro and Moreno (2011), Montoro (2011), Gray (2011), Glocker and Towbin (2012)
for the discussion of country experiences.
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for price stability.2 The main idea behind using reserve requirements as the main
instrument for financial stability and interest rate as the main instrument for price
stability might be to separate tasks, which increases transparency and facilitates
communication of these policies. In this regard, this study explicitly focuses on the
financial stability of reserve requirements.
Central banks could use reserve requirements to achieve financial stability in
the following manner as Montoro and Moreno (2011) noted: they can raise reserve
requirements to contain credit growth in the boom part of the business cycle in
order to counteract financial imbalances in the economy or in an economic downturn,
they can lower reserve requirements to utilize reserve buffers accumulated during the
boom part, having the banking sector extend more credit to non-financial businesses.
Therefore, reserve requirements can be used as a cyclical policy instrument to ease
credit fluctuations in the financial sector, and hence to stabilize the real economy.
The goal of this study is to investigate the effectiveness of reserve requirements
that respond to expected credit growth in moderating the real and financial cycles of
an economy. We do so in a model where real and financial fluctuations are amplified
by a financial accelerator mechanism. Specifically, we explore the stabilizing role
of reserve requirements as a credit policy tool, on the transmission mechanism of
productivity, monetary and financial shocks. The results suggest that a time-varying
reserve requirement policy mitigates the fluctuations in key macroeconomic variables
and improves welfare vis-a-vis a fixed reserve requirement policy.3
2Basci (2010).
3At this point, we acknowledge that cancelling reserve requirements altogether might improve
aggregate welfare of the economy. However, mostly due to precautionary reasons, positive reserve
requirements do exist in practice and since it is beyond the scope of this paper, we do not bring
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Figure 2.1: Evolution of Required Reserve Ratios in Turkey
We extend the basic financial intermediation framework to one in which “money”
is explicitly modelled via a cash-in-advance constraint. Consequently, we introduce
required reserves into the model in a very tractable way, since we have the concept
of a monetary base.
After the mid of 2010, the CBRT has determined two policy targets in order to
mitigate macro-financial imbalances in Turkish economy as Basci and Kara (2011)
elaborated. The first one is to reduce short-term capital inflows to lower current
account deficit, and the second one is to curb excessive credit growth in banking
any micro-foundation to this institutional framework in what follows.
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sector. In this regard, it was decided that in addition to short-term interest rate,
reserve requirements and interest rate corridor are used to foster financial stability
without compromising price stability. Moreover, in order to increase the effectiveness
of reserve requirements as a policy tool, the CBRT let the interest rate fluctuate in
a controlled manner at overnight market to use interest rate corridor as an active
policy instrument and terminated paying interest on required reserves by September
2010. It also differentiated required reserves at different maturities (having a higher
required reserve ratio for short-term liabilities) and hence extended the maturity of
banking sector’s liabilities in order to strengthen financial stability.
We calibrate the model to the Turkish economy which exemplifies the use of
reserve requirements as a macroprudential tool since the end of 2010 (see figure 2.1).
In particular, the CBRT has increased weighted average of required reserves ratio –
henceforth, RRR – from 5% to 13% between the period October 2010 and April 2011,
in a stepwise manner. This period also coincides with the aftermath of the second
phase of quantitative easing implemented by monetary authorities in a number of
advanced economies. Evidently, this period is characterized by an increase in the
risk appetite of global investors and excessive credit growth in emerging economies
such as Turkey. On the other hand, same measure of RRR has been reduced to
about 10% around November 2011 by the CBRT following the debt crisis of the
Euro area.
Our quantitative exercise involves comparing a “fixed RRR economy” in which
the RRR is calibrated to its “long-run” value preceding the interventions of the
CBRT and the “time-varying RRR economy” in which the RRR is countercycli-
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cal with respect to expected credit growth.4 We approximate the required reserves
policy implemented by the CBRT with this countercyclical rule since the CBRT of-
ficials and economists stated that it used the reserve requirements to curb excessive
credit growth in the banking sector after the second phase of quantitative easing
conducted by many advanced economies’ central banks and to ease credit condi-
tions in the banking sector after the Eurozone debt crisis.5 Moreover, we model
the rule as the one which reacts to expected credit growth in order to reflect the
CBRT’s incentive to use this policy tool proactively and in a macroprudential and
forward-looking manner.6 We also simulate the model under moderate and aggres-
sive required reserve policies in order to understand the effectiveness of the policy
as a macroprudential policy tool.
There are three main results of this study: First, the time-varying required
reserve ratio rule mitigates the negative effects of adverse macroeconomic and finan-
cial shocks and the financial accelerator mechanism on real and financial variables.
As a result, we conclude that RRRs might be used as a macroprudential policy
tool in an economy that exhibits financial frictions. Second, in response to TFP
and money growth shocks, countercyclical reserves policy reduces the volatilities of
key variables such as output, consumption, investment, bank credit, credit spreads
and asset prices in comparison with fixed reserves policy. This happens because
the amplification effect of the financial sector is mitigated by time-varying reserve
4We also conduct the analysis of a model economy with zero required reserves policy. The
dynamics of this case strongly resemble those of the fixed RRR economy.
5Basci and Kara (2011) and Kara (2012).
6The results seem quite similar if the rule responds to current credit growth. The main idea
behind this rule is to reduce the procyclicality of the banking sector in the face of adverse macro
shocks and hence to stabilize the real economy.
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requirements. Third, a time-varying reserve requirement policy is welfare superior
to a fixed reserve requirement policy.
The workings of the model might be elaborated in greater detail as follows:
An adverse TFP shock reduces the demand of financial intermediaries for equity
and drives down its price. The collapse in asset prices feeds back into the endoge-
nous capital constraints of intermediaries and causes banks’ net worth to decline.
Accordingly, the shortage in loanable funds, which manifests itself as a rise in credit
spreads, combined with the collapse in asset prices causes investment to decline
substantially. When the RRR is fixed, the dynamics of reserves resembles that of
deposits.
When the countercyclical RRR policy is in place, the fall in bank credit led
by the adverse TFP shock calls for a reduction in the RRR. This induces banks to
substitute loans for reserves on the assets side of the balance sheet, because the cost
of raising external finance is lower with a smaller RRR. Accordingly, larger supply
of funds extended by banks mitigates the collapse in investment and asset prices,
countervailing the financial accelerator mechanism. This also limits the rise in credit
spreads, which is an intertemporal distortion created by financial frictions in the
consumption-savings margin of workers. The downward response of RRR reduces
the demand for monetary base and shoots up inflation on impact. Therefore, the
credit policy mitigates the financial accelerator at the expense of higher inflation.
However, since this immediate surge is transitory and driven by the reserves policy,
the model implies an undershooting of inflation in the following periods. This implies
a substitution of consumption for leisure on the part of forward looking households
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and labor supply increases in contrast with the fixed RRR economy. Increased
labor supply combined with a stronger trajectory for capital mitigates the collapse
in output significantly.
A positive money growth shock increases inflation and crowds out deposits
and consumption for leisure in our cash-in-advance specification. Therefore, a posi-
tive money growth produces similar dynamics to that of TFP shocks in the model.
Consequently, the counter-cyclical RRR policy rule stabilizes key financial and real
variables in response to money growth shocks again at the expense of higher infla-
tion.
Lastly, we run a financial crisis experiment in which we consider an exoge-
nous decline in the net worth of financial intermediaries as in Hancock, Laing and
Wilcox (1995), Meh and Moran (2010), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Curdia
and Woodford (2010), Mendoza and Quadrini (2010), Iacoviello (2010), and Mimir
(2011). This shock crudely captures loan losses, asset write-downs or asset revalu-
ations that we observe in the recent financial crisis. Most importantly, it might be
interpreted as an exogenous variation in the risk appetite of international investors,
that may have destabilizing effects on the financial system of an economy such as
Turkey.
Although the initial decline in banks’ net worth led by the financial shock is
exogenous, there will be second round effects that amplify the collapse in internal
finance of banks. This would create a shortage of bank credit and would drive a
drop in investment, and in the price of capital. Banks then increase their demand
for external financing (i.e. increase their deposit demand) to compensate for the
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decline in bank net worth. This causes reserves to increase and drives down inflation,
pointing out a difference from the case of TFP and money growth shocks on part
of the nominal dynamics. Yet, since the shock is transitory, inflation overshoots in
the period that follows the shock and workers’ expectations regarding the hike in
future inflation causes hours to decline substantially on impact. Therefore, output
collapses together with investment.
Credit policy in response to financial shock calls for a reduction in the RRR
and is again inflationary in the sense that the reduction in inflation on impact
becomes substantially lower. Accordingly, overshooting in inflation becomes less as
well, limiting the collapse in hours. In this manner, the analysis shows that the
counter-cyclical RRR policy has a stabilizing effect in response to financial shocks
in addition to TFP and money growth shocks and might be used by the central
bank as a macroprudential policy tool.
Related Literature
Our work is mostly related to the studies by Glocker and Towbin (2012) and Mon-
toro (2011) who analyze the role of reserve requirements as a macroprudential policy
tool. Glocker and Towbin (2012) augment required reserves as an additional policy
instrument and variations in loans as an additional target into an open-economy
model with nominal rigidities and financial frictions. Their results imply that re-
quirements are in favor of price stability objective only if financial frictions are non-
trivial and are more effective if there is a financial stability objective and debt is
denominated in foreign currency. In their work, due to the endogeneity of monetary
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base, an increase in the RRR increases loan-deposit spreads only if the remuneration
of reserves is below the market rate. Since they obtain impact of policy change on
consumption and investment, the overall effect on aggregate demand and inflation
is ambiguous.
Montoro (2011) introduces counter-cyclical RRR policy tools in an otherwise
standard New-Keynesian setting that introduce collateral and liquidity constraints
as in Kiyotaki and Moore (2008) and maturity mismatch frictions as in Benes and
Lees (2010). He finds that RRRs contain the procyclicality of the financial system
in response to demand shocks but not under supply shocks. The main differences
of our work with these papers is that we model financial frictions a-la’ Gertler and
Karadi (2011) that introduces an agency problem between depositors and bankers
and that involves equity financing of non-financial firms. An important deviation
from the former study is that we also explore the role of RRRs in response to financial
shocks and from the latter study is that we find that RRRs might be stabilizing even
under supply shocks. From an alternative perspective, our finding that credit policy
implemented by RRRs is the most effective in response to financial shocks is in line
with the finding of Glocker and Towbin (2012) that RRRs are mostly effective when
financial frictions are relevant.
Another closely related work to the current study is that of Christensen et al.
(2011) which explores the role of countercyclical bank capital regulations as a macro-
prudential policy tool. Similar to our experiment, they compare time-varying and
constant bank capital regulations and find that the former regime reduces volatili-
ties of real variables and bank lending. However, as they state in their paper, the
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type of financial friction that they introduce differs from that of Gertler and Karadi
(2011) in that it is driven by asymmetric information between bankers and their
creditors a la’ Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), instead of limited commitment. While
the macroprudential regulation in their work is focused on the “size” of the balance
sheet, in our work it is focused on the “composition of the assets side” of the balance
sheet.
Our work also has linkages to closed economy frameworks of Kashyap and Stein
(2012) and Curdia and Woodford (2011) in which the remuneration of reserves has
been studied. Yet, it is obvious that reserves policy studied in these papers are more
related to the central bank balance sheet considerations of the Federal Reserve at
the onset of the sub-prime financial crisis and do not have the focus of containing
excessive credit growth in contrast with the focus of our work. From another per-
spective, the descriptive work of Gray (2011) on recent reserve requirement policy
experiences and the work of Reinhart and Reinhart (1999) on the use of required
reserves for stability of international capital flows relates to the current study.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the model
economy and characterizes equilibrium. Section 2.3 undertakes the quantitative
analysis regarding the dynamics introduced by macroeconomic and financial shocks
and section 2.4 concludes.
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2.2 The Model
The model economy is inhabited by households, banks, final goods producers,
capital producers, and a government. Time is discrete. Two financial frictions
characterize the economy. First, market segmentation ensures that households who
are the ultimate savers in the economy cannot directly lend to non-financial firms.
This assumption makes the banking sector essential for transferring funds from
ultimate savers (households) to ultimate borrowers (final goods producers). Second,
banking sector is characterized by credit frictions that are modelled a la Gertler
and Karadi (2011). Households face a cash-in-advance constraint, which makes
them hold real balances, leading to the existence of monetary equilibria. Finally,
banks are subject to time-varying reserve requirements imposed by the central bank,
which reacts countercyclically to expected credit expansion in the economy. Below
is a detailed description of economic agents that reside in this model economy.
2.2.1 Households
The population consists of a continuum of infinitely-lived identical households.
We assume that each household is composed of a worker and a banker who perfectly
insure each other. Workers supply labor to the final goods producers and assumed
to deposit their savings in the banks owned by the banker member of “other” house-
holds.7
A representative household maximizes the discounted lifetime utility flow earned
7This assumption is useful in making the agency problem that we introduce in section 2.2.2
more realistic.
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where 0 < β < 1 the subjective discount factor and E is the expectation operator.
Households face the following flow budget constraint,
ct + bt+1 +
Mt+1
Pt







where bt is the beginning of period t balance of deposits held at commercial banks, Pt
is the general nominal price level, wt is the real wage earned per labor hour, Rt is the
gross risk free deposits rate, Πt is the profits remitted from the ownership of banks
and capital producers and Tt is lump-sum transfers remitted by the government.
Households face a cash-in-advance constraint which reflects the timing assump-







+Rtbt − bt+1 (2.3)
Solution of the utility maximization problem of households yield the optimality
conditions below,
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Condition (2.4) is a standard consumption-savings optimality condition, which equates
marginal benefit of current consumption to the expected discounted benefit of sav-
ing in deposits. Equation (2.5) on the other hand is a non-standard consumption-
leisure optimality condition due to the existence of cash-in-advance friction which
transforms the trade-off between the two into an inter-temporal one. Specifically,




future units because the yield of cash balances is deflated by inflation. Therefore,
the utility cost of leisure is measured only in terms of future utility foregone by
facing a tighter cash-in-advance constraint in the next period.
2.2.2 Banks
The modelling of financial sector closely follows that in Gertler and Karadi
(2011). To summarize the key ingredients, we denote the period t balance sheet of
a bank j as,
qtsjt = (1 − rrt)bjt+1 + njt (2.6)
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The right hand side of the balance sheet denotes the resources of bank j,
namely, net worth, njt and deposits, bt+1 needed to finance its credit extension to
non-financial firms, qtsjt. The loans to firms serve as state-contingent claims sjt
towards the ownership of firms and are traded at the market price qt. Note that
the bank can only loan (1 − rrt) fraction of deposits to the firms where rrt is the
required reserve ratio set by the central bank as we describe below. The balance















It is evident in equation (2.7) that an increase in the required reserve ratio
rrt decreases the returns to assets and increases the returns to equity all else equal.
That induces banks to substitute internal financing (nt) for external financing (bt+1).
Bankers have a finite life and survive to the next period with probability θ. At
the end of each period 1 − θ number of new bankers are born and are remitted ǫ
1−θ
of the net worth owned by the exiting bankers. Bankers’ objective is to maximize
the present discounted value of the terminal net worth of their financial firm, Vjt,






















The finite life of bankers, θ < 1, ensures that bankers never accumulate enough net
worth to finance all their equity purchases of non-financial firms via internal funds
so that they have to borrow from households in the form of deposits.
The key feature of the financial sector unfolds around a moral hazard problem
between banks and households: In this model of banking, households believe that
banks might divert λ fraction of their total assets for their own benefit. This might
be thought of as investing part of qtsjt in excessively risky projects that go bankrupt
eventually and not paying back the corresponding liability to the depositor. In this
case, depositors shall cause a bank run and lead to the liquidation of the bank
altogether. Therefore, bankers’ optimal plan regarding the choice of sjt at any date
t should satisfy an incentive compatibility constraint,
Vjt ≥ λqtsjt (2.9)
This inequality suggests that the loss of bankers, Vjt, from diverting the funds
and investing them in risky projects that would likely fail should be greater than or
equal to the diverted portion of the assets, λqtsjt.
By using an envelope condition and algebraic manipulation, one can write the
70
optimal value of banks as





























represent the marginal values of relaxing credit and accumulating net worth for the








One can obtain the following by combining equations (2.9) and (2.10):
νtqtsjt + ηtnjt ≥ λqtsjt (2.13)
The above constraint binds only if 0 < νt < λ. This happens because ηtnjt is
greater than zero. If νt ≥ λ, then left hand side would be strictly greater than right
8Proofs of equations (2.10), (2.11), and (2.12) are available in technical appendix upon request.
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hand side in equation (2.13). Under plausible values of parameters, this constraint
always binds in equilibrium, which in turn produces the endogenous borrowing con-




njt = κtnjt. (2.14)
This endogenous constraint which emerges from the costly enforcement prob-
lem described above ensures that banks’ leverage might always be equal to ηt
λ−νt
and
is decreasing with the fraction of funds (λ) that depositors believe that banks will
divert.
Due to the fact that κt does not depend on j, one can aggregate equation
(2.14) and obtain the following aggregate relationship:
qtst = κtnt (2.15)
where st and nt represent aggregate levels of banks’ assets and net worth, respec-
tively.
The evolution of aggregate net worth depends on that of the surviving bankers
(net+1) and the start-up funds of the new entrants (nnt+1):
nt+1 = net+1 + nnt+1. (2.16)
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The net worth of new entrants is defined as an ǫ fraction of banks’ aggregate
net worth, that is:9
nnt+1 = ǫnt (2.17)
The fact that θ fraction of banks survive over next period equates the net














One can sum up equations (2.17) and (2.18) to obtain the evolution of net


















Equation (2.19) shows that the evolution of net worth depends on effective
spread and leverage ratio of banks.
9This assumption is slightly different from that in Gertler&Karadi (2011). They assume that
the net worth of newly entering bankers is a fraction of banks’ total assets rather than its net
worth. Since the fraction is small, it does not change the main results of the study significantly.
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2.2.3 Firms
Firms produce the consumption good by using physical capital and labor as
production factors. They operate with a constant returns to scale technology F (., .)
that is subject to total factor productivity shocks, zt
yt = exp(zt)F (kt, ht) (2.20)
where
zt+1 = ρzzt + ǫzt+1 (2.21)
with zero mean and constant variance innovations, ǫzt+1.
Firms finance capital at date t by issuing claims st to financial intermediaries
and acquire capital kt+1 from capital producers. Therefore,
qtst = qtkt+1 (2.22)
with qt is the market price of the firms’ equity and capital.
Banks’ claim against the ownership of the firm pays out its dividend via the
marginal product of capital in the next period. Hence, the cost of credit to the firm
is state-contingent. As a result, the cost of credit to the firm must satisfy
Rkt =




Finally, the optimal labor demand of the firm must satisfy the usual static
condition,
wt = exp(zt)Fh(kt, ht) (2.24)
which equates marginal product of labor to the marginal cost of it.
2.2.4 Capital Producers
Capital producers are introduced in order to obtain variation in the price
of capital which is necessary for the financial accelerator mechanism to operate.
To that end, capital producers provide physical capital to the firms and repair the
depreciated capital and incur the cost of investment. Consequently, the optimization
problem of capital producers reads,
max
it
qtkt+1 − qt(1 − δ)kt − it (2.25)
subject to the capital accumulation technology,





where the function Φ(·) represents the capital adjustment cost. The optimality
condition that emerges from the solution to this problem is the well-known “q”











The government is essentially responsible for coordinating monetary policy.
To that end, it controls the supply of money M0t+1 and determines the required
reserve ratio rrt. Any growth of the monetary base is remitted to households in the
form of lump-sum transfers, Tt. The monetary base grows at the rate µt,
M0t+1 = exp(µt)M0t (2.28)
where the growth rate of money supply is subject to zero mean, constant variance
normally distributed innovations so that,
µt+1 = (1 − ρµ)µ̄+ ρµµt + ǫµt+1 (2.29)
In order to contain the financial accelerator mechanism, the government uses
required reserves as a macroprudential rule. Specifically, the required reserves ratio
is assumed to follow a rule that reacts to the expected growth rate of bank credit
at date t+ 1 compared to its level in the current period.10
rrt = r̄r + φEt [log(qt+1st+1) − log(qtst)] (2.30)
10We also consider a rule which reacts to current credit growth rather than expected future
credit growth. The main results of the study remain unchanged as can be seen from Appendix
B.2.
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where, r̄r is the steady-state value of the required reserves ratio and φ > 0. Con-
sequently, the central bank increases the effective profit to banks of extending new
loans when credit in the aggregate economy is shrinking, and vice versa. The gov-
ernment budget constraint is given by
Tt = Mt+1 −Mt + Ptrrtbt+1 − Ptrrt−1bt (2.31)
The government uses the seignorage revenue plus the increases in its reserves to
finance the lump-sum transfer payments to households, which include both workers
and bankers.11 Within this framework, the money market equilibrium turns out as
the following condition:
M0t+1 = Mt+1 + Ptrrtbt+1 (2.32)
where Pt is the general price level of the consumption good. The money supply
equals to the currency demand by workers plus the reserve demand by bankers. Since
the left hand side is exogenously determined by the central bank, equilibrium in the
money market might call for adjustments in price level in response to fluctuations
in reserves. That being said, we also want to emphasize the fact that flexible-price
models are not good models in explaining the dynamics of inflation. The only reason
to talk about inflation dynamics here is to show that using reserve requirements leads
to a possibly interesting trade-off between price stability and financial stability faced
11The lump-sum transfer payments to the households equals to the change in money demand
by workers plus the change in reserves demand by bankers.
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by many emerging market central banks recently. To be precise, this trade-off is to
reduce the intertemporal distortions created by the credit spread at the expense of
generating higher inflation volatility.
2.2.6 Competitive Equilibrium
Notice that nominal monetary base and prices grow constantly in this model,
which renders the equations listed above non-stationary. Therefore, following Coo-
ley and Hansen (1989), we make the model stationary by applying the following
normalizations: P̂t = Pt/M0t+1 and m̂t = Mt+1/(P̂tM0t+1) and solve the model
locally around a deterministic steady state.
A competitive equilibrium of this model economy is defined by sequences of al-
locations {ct, kt+1, it, lt, ht, st, nt, net, nnt, bt+1,Λt,t+1, νt, ηt, κt, ρt,t+1, χt,t+1, m̂t+1, πt}
∞
t=0,
prices {qt, Rkt+1, Rt+1, wt, P̂t}
∞
t=0, shock processes {zt, µt}
∞
t=0 and the government pol-
icy {rrt}
∞





1 = βEtRt+1Λt,t+1 (2.34)
ct =
exp(µt) − 1 + m̂tP̂t
P̂texp(µt)














qtst = κtnt (2.38)















net = θ̺t−1,tnt−1 (2.42)
nnt = ǫnt−1 (2.43)























wt = exp(zt)Fh(kt, ht) (2.47)
Rkt =
exp(zt)Fk(kt, ht) + qt(1 − δ)
qt−1
(2.48)













exp(zt)F (kt, ht) = ct + it (2.51)
st = kt+1 (2.52)






zt+1 = ρzzt + ǫzt+1 (2.55)
µt+1 = (1 − ρµ)µ̄+ ρµµt + ǫµt+1 (2.56)
rrt = r̄r + φEt [log(qt+1st+1) − log(qtst)] (2.57)
1
P̂t
= m̂t+1 + rrtbt+1 (2.58)
2.3 Quantitative Analysis
2.3.1 Functional Forms









with γ > 1, ψ, ν > 0.
Production: Firms produce according to a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas
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production function:





with 0 < α < 1.














The parameter values used in the quantitative analysis are reported in Table
2.1. The preference and production parameters are standard in business cycle liter-
ature. The share of capital in the production function is set to 0.4, and the capital
adjustment cost parameter is 2.75. We borrow the standard values of γ and v from
literature as 2 and 2, respectively. We take the quarterly discount factor, β as 0.9885
to match the 2006-2011 average annualized real deposit rate, 4.73%, in Turkey. We
pick the relative utility weight of labor ψ to fix hours worked in steady state, L, at
one third of the available time. The quarterly depreciation rate of capital is set to
3.7% to match the 1987-2011 average annual investment to capital ratio of 14.8% in
Turkey.
Parameters related to the financial sector are calibrated to match financial
statistics of the Turkish economy in the period 2006-2011. We set ǫ to 0.001 so
that the proportional transfer to newly entering bankers is 5.71% of aggregate net
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Table 2.1: Paremeter Values in the Benchmark Model
Description Value Target
Preferences
Quarterly discount factor (β) 0.9885 Annualized real deposit rate (4.73%)
Relative utility weight of consumption (γ) 2
CRRA parameter in the utility (v) 2 Literature
Relative utility weight of leisure (ψ) 15.182 Hours worked (0.33)
Production Technology
Share of capital in output (α) 0.4 Labor share of output (0.64)
Capital adjustment cost parameter (ϕ) 2.75 Relative volatility of investment = 2.25
Depreciation rate of capital (δ) 0.037 Average annual ratio of investment to capital (14.8%)
Government
Steady-state value of RRR (r̄r) 0.05 Pre macroprudential policy period
Adjustment parameter in the RRR rule (φ) 5.15 Standard deviation of differences in RRR for 2009:4-
2012:2 (1.73%)
Financial Intermediaries
Fraction of diverted loans (λ) 0.5 Annual commercial & industrial loan spread (1.96%)
Prop. transfer to the entering bankers (ǫ) 0.001 5.71% of aggregate net worth
Survival probability of the bankers (θ) 0.962 Capital adequacy ratio of 16% for commercial banks
Shock Processes
Persistence of TFP process (ρz) 0.9821 Estimated from detrended log TFPt = ρz log TFPt−1 + ǫzt
Std. deviation of productivity shocks (σz) 0.0183
Persistence of money growth process (ρµ) 0.5702 Estimated from log∆M1t = ρµ log∆M1t−1 + ǫµt
Std. deviation of money growth shocks (σµ)0.0275
worth. We pick the fraction of diverted funds, λ, and the survival probability, θ,
simultaneously to match the following two targets: an average interest rate spread of
48 basis points, which is the historical average of the difference between the quarterly
commercial and industrial loan rates and the quarterly deposit rate from 2006:Q1
to 2011:Q4, and an average capital adequacy ratio of 16%, which is the historical
average of Turkish commercial banks’ capital adequacy ratio for the same period.12
12The legal target of risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio set by the Banking Regulation and
Supervision Agency in Turkey is 8%, however, commercial banks in Turkey maintain 16% for this
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The resulting values for λ and θ are 0.5 and 0.962, respectively. The benchmark
model involves the macroprudential policy rule illustrated in equation (2.30) which
does not alter the steady state of the model but affects the dynamics around it. We
calibrate the response parameter of the RRR rule φ to 5.15 in order to match the
standard deviation of the differences in RRR of 1.73% for the Turkish economy in
the period 2009:4-2012:2.
We estimate an AR(1) process for the log of TFP for the period 1988:Q2-
2011:Q2 and find a persistence of, ρz = 0.9821, and a standard deviation of in-
novations to TFP, σz = 0.0183. The money growth process on the other hand is
estimated for the period 2003:Q1-2011:Q4 using M1 series, following Cooley and
Hansen (1989).13 Estimation results implied a persistence of, ρz = 0.5702, and a
standard deviation of innovations to money growth shocks, σµ = 0.0275.
With the parameterized economy, we first illustrate the role of financial accel-
erator driven by credit frictions in the banking sector. We then study the dynamics
of the model by focusing on impulse responses to one standard deviation nega-
tive productivity and positive money growth shocks in environments that involve
alternative required reserves policies. We also document implications of using a
time-varying required reserves ratio in terms of its effect on the volatilities of real
and financial variables in order to understand its effectiveness as a macroprudential
policy tool. Finally, we analyze the welfare implications of alternative RRR policies.
ratio in practice.
13The choice of estimation period reflects the structural disinflation that the Turkish economy
has experienced, see Sunel (2011). Moreover, we also estimated an AR(1) for the money growth
process using M0 series. The parameters of the process are quite similar.
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2.3.2 Findings
In the following subsections, we first display the role of financial accelerator by
comparing the usual cash-in-advance model with the model described in section 2.2.
We then compare the dynamics of negative TFP and positive money growth shocks
under two model economies with time-varying and fixed RRR policies. Lastly, we
run a financial crisis experiment, in which the net worth of banks are hit by a one-
time exogenous shock, and compare the implications of the two reserve requirement
regimes.14
2.3.2.1 Amplifying Effect of Financial Frictions
The dashed plots in figures 2.2 and 2.3 represent the monetary economy that
exhibits financial accelerator mechanism and the straight plots represent the cash-
in-advance model with no financial frictions. Required reserves ratio in the former
economy is set to zero to isolate the impact of financial frictions.
Figure 2.2 below illustrates that the collapse in output, investment, price of
capital and loan-deposit spreads is amplified when financial frictions are in place.
We especially want to highlight the almost tripling increase in the reduction of
investment and asset prices and 250 basis points of increase in the credit spreads in
annualized terms. The last one is even more striking because in the economy with
no financial frictions, there is no-arbitrage between return to capital and return
to deposits. The evident amplification owes to the reduced demand of banks for
14We also analyzed the case with zero reserve requirements policy. Since the dynamics are quite
similar to a fixed RRR regime, we do not report those results, which are available upon request.
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Figure 2.2: Negative Productivity Shocks
86































































Figure 2.3: Positive Money Growth Shocks
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deposits in case of lower productivity. This stems from the decline in the return to
state-contingent equity issued by firms when productivity is lower. This depresses
the price of equity issued by firms and results in a collapse in the value of funds
provided to them. As a result, firms acquire less capital and investment declines
more.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the dynamics in response to a positive money growth
shock. An important feature of this cash-in-advance economy is that as equa-
tions (2.3) (with equality) and (2.5) illustrate, investment and leisure are cash and
credit goods, respectively. Therefore, when inflation rises following a positive money
growth shock, labor supply and investment decreases causing a decline in output.
We again obtain amplified responses of investment, asset prices, output and credit
spreads on impact following the shock. Yet, the trajectory of all variables except the
last appears to be similar to the economy with no financial frictions. The amplified
response of investment is coupled with larger degree of declines in asset prices and
credit spreads as in the case of TFP shocks. We also note that the quantitative
impact of monetary shocks are much smaller compared to TFP shocks.
We now analyze the implications of the RRR policy on the dynamics of real,
financial, and monetary variables. In figures 2.4 and 2.5, we compare the dynamics
of these variables in response to one standard deviation negative TFP and positive
money growth shocks. In figure 2.6 we explore the implications of RRR policy
on the dynamics model variables in a financial crisis scenario. The specific financial
disruption is a balance sheet shock that bankers face as in mostly recent literature.15
15Hancock, Laing and Wilcox (1995), Meh and Moran (2010), Brunnermeier and Pedersen
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In figures 2.4 to 2.6, the dashed plots correspond to the benchmark econ-
omy with the countercyclical RRR rule and the straight plots correspond to an
economy with fixed RRR. The dynamics of the economy with no reserves closely
resemble those with a fixed RRR. Therefore for space considerations, we do not
discuss them here and only present the comparison of fixed RRR economy with
the benchmark economy that displays a countercyclical RRR.16 Unless otherwise is
stated, the numbers in the y-axes correspond to percentage deviations of variables
from their long-run values. For the case of inflation and RRR, we plot percentage
“point changes” and for the case of credit spreads we plot “basis point changes” in
annualized terms. In addition, we explore the impact of implementing aggressive
credit policy rules by increasing the response parameter φ. In these experiments, as
anticipated, the impact of the time-varying RRR rule is enhanced when φ is larger.17
(2009), Curdia and Woodford (2010), Mendoza and Quadrini (2010), Iacoviello (2010), and Mimir
(2011).
16The dynamics of the economy with no reserves can be found in Appendix B.3.












































































































































Figure 2.4: Impulse Responses Led by a 1-σ Adverse TFP Shock
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2.3.2.2 Impulse Responses to TFP Shocks
The general observation that emerges from figure 2.4 is that the time-varying
RRR policy dampens the impact of the financial accelerator on key macroeconomic
real and financial variables at the expense of higher inflation in response to TFP
shocks.
In the economy with fixed RRR, as expected, households reduce their demand
for consumption and supply of deposits in response to the adverse TFP shock since
output and the profits that accrue from the ownership of banks and capital producers
are lower. On the banks’ side, the reduced TFP highlights the reduction in the
profitability of equity loans to firms, inducing them to reduce their demand for
deposits.
Under fixed RRR economy, as figure 2.4 shows, the net worth of banks collapse
by 4% reflecting the feedback effect of a 0.6% decline in asset prices through the
endogenous capital constraint of banks, represented by equation (2.15). The decline
in net worth in accordance with the decline in deposits downsizes the total financing
for non-financial firms (see figure 2.4). However, since the decline in bank capital
is larger than that of the value of bank assets, the model implies a countercyclical
bank leverage, which increases by 3.5%. On the other hand, the scarcity of funds
for firms shoots up loan-deposits spreads by about 250 basis points in annualized
terms (see the middle panel of figure 2.4). The reduction in the quantity of equities
traded and the collapse in asset prices trigger a downsizing in bank credit of about
0.75%. As a combined outcome of these dynamics, investment falls by 3.75% and
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output declines by about 1.75%.
The nominal price level increases (the bottom panel of figure 2.4) because the
economy is now less productive in generating output. Hence, inflation increases by
0.2 percentage points causing the real balances demand to decline and consumption
velocity of monetary base to increase by about 1%.
Now, we explain how the credit policy defined by a countercyclical RRR rule
mitigates the impact of the financial accelerator on key macroeconomic real and
financial variables (see the dashed plots in figure 2.4). Since bank credit declines in
response to the adverse TFP shock, the policy rule implies a reduction in the RRR
by about 1 percentage point, which can be seen in the bottom panel of the figure.
This reduces the cost of extending credit for banks and induces a substitution from
reserves balances to loans in the asset side of their balance sheet. Consequently,
the stronger demand for firm equity stabilizes the price of it on impact, and the
peak of decline in equity price is about 0.2% less than how much it is in the fixed
RRR economy. The substitution in the balance sheet of banks combined with the
better outlook of asset prices reduce the collapse in bank credit from 0.8% to 0.2%.
Accordingly, output and investment decline by 1.3% and 3.5% less than how much
they decline in the fixed RRR economy.
The support of the central bank via lower reserve requirements cause credit
spreads to rise by about 150 basis points less compared to the fixed RRR econ-
omy over 5 quarters. We emphasize this finding because credit spreads introduce
an intertemporal wedge to the savings decision of the aggregate economy and are
created by financial frictions. The relatively muted response of spreads stems from
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the reduced decline in return to firm equity. The stronger outlook of the economy
reflects into the balance sheet of banks and bank capital declines by 4% less com-
pared to the fixed RRR economy and even increases above its long-run level for 20
quarters, since RRR is lower than its long-run value for about 30 quarters. The
immediate implication of stronger trajectory of net worth is a rise of virtually zero
in bank leverage on impact (against a 3.25% hike with fixed RRR) and even implies
a decline of it up to 2% caused by the increase in bank capital.
The substantial collapse in reserves demand (about 20%) drives down the price
of money and amplifies the upwards response of inflation obtained in the fixed RRR
economy (see bottom panel of figure 2.4). However, since this immediate surge is
transitory and driven by the reserves policy, the model implies an undershooting of
inflation in the coming 7 quarters. This implies a substitution of consumption for
leisure on the part of forward looking households and labor supply increases by 2%
more compared to the fixed RRR economy. Hence, we obtain the stabilizing impact
of the countercyclical RRR rule on the dynamics of output displayed in the top
panel of figure 2.4. Consistent with these findings, real balances demand collapses
on impact but outweighs its steady state level along the transition and consumption
velocity increases by 11% more than the fixed RRR economy.
To sum up, we obtain the interesting result that the countercyclical RRR
policy mitigates the impact of financial accelerator triggered by TFP shocks on
real and financial variables at the expense of higher inflation. Now, we explore the














































































































































Figure 2.5: Impulse Responses Led by a 1-σ Adverse Money Growth Shock
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2.3.2.3 Impulse Responses to Money Growth Shocks
In this section, we analyze the dynamics of model economies in response to
a one-standard deviation positive money growth shock. Figure 2.5 displays the
impulse responses of key real, financial and monetary variables. Although the impact
of a money growth shock on those variables is an order of magnitude smaller than
that of a productivity shock, these figures deliver the same message as in the previous
section that the time-varying RRR policy mitigates the adverse effects of money
growth shocks on real and financial variables driven by the financial accelerator
mechanism while creating higher inflation rates compared to fixed RRR policy.
We should firstly note that the dynamics of the model with fixed required
reserves ratio policy strongly resemble the properties of a standard stochastic cash-
in-advance economy by Stockman (1981) and Cooley and Hansen (1989), which is
modified to cover bank deposits in the cash-in-advance constraint. In this sense, we
follow the timing assumption of Cooley and Hansen (1989) that asset markets open
first for workers, but with the difference that bt+1 is not necessarily (and actually
never) equal to zero, and higher rates of inflation discourage household savings in
the form of deposits. In the end, the general mechanism in this basic model is
broadly summarized by the idea that an expansionary shock to the growth rate
of money supply raises inflation rate and induces households to substitute credit
goods for cash goods. The reflection of that mechanism to the current model is that
consumption and deposit savings decline and leisure demand increases as implied by
equations (2.3) and (2.5). Since deposit savings are intermediated to non-financial
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firms’ equity financing, investment declines in response to a positive money growth
shock. Lower investment and the decline in labor supply then reduce output and
consumption.
In the fixed RRR economy, inflation rate increases by about 0.2% percentage
points on impact. This reduces hours worked by 0.25% since consumption and
deposits are the cash goods and leisure is the credit good. The fall in household
deposits leads to a reduction in bank credit in the form of equity purchases. As the
demand for non-financial firms’ shares decline, the price of equity falls by 0.07%.
The decline in equity prices causes bank net worth to shrink by 0.4% on impact,
leading to a rise in credit spreads by about 20 annualized basis points. Since the cost
of financing capital expenditures is now higher for non-financial firms, investment
and output drop by 0.4% and 0.15%, respectively. In terms of monetary variables,
as inflation rate rises, real money balances decrease and consumption velocity surges
by 0.4%.
When the central bank puts the credit policy to work, RRR declines about
0.06 percentage points as bank credit falls in response to a positive money growth
shock. There is an immediate decline of 1.25% in the reserves, and deposit demand
by banks. The reduced cost of extending credit induces banks to substitute away
their assets from reserves to firm equity, and accordingly the initial decline in bank
credit is 0.07% smaller. As equity purchases by banks are larger, the decline in
the price of equity on impact is totally eliminated in comparison to the fixed RRR
policy. This is reflected into the balance sheet of banks and intermediary capital
does not decline at all compared to a reduction of 0.45% in the fixed RRR economy.
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Furthermore, the rise in credit spreads are about 15 annualized basis points lower
and the stronger trajectory of bank net worth causes leverage to decline by 0.05%
over 5 quarters instead of an increase of about 0.4%. Since credit spreads are the
main source of intertemporal distortion caused by the credit frictions in financial
sector, the central bank effectively mitigates the adverse impact of this distortion
on the economy via implementing a lower reserve requirement policy. As another
favorable result of these dynamics, investment falls by 0.3% less in the case of time-
varying reserve requirements.
The initial fall in reserves by 1.2% creates an excess supply of monetary base
in the economy and raises the inflation rate by 0.25% percentage points to restore
equilibrium in the money market (see figure 2.5). Therefore the trade-off between
price and financial stability is still evident under money growth shocks. This causes
the real money demand to decline and consumption velocity of monetary base to
rise by 0.6% more. Lastly, we again obtain the undershooting of inflation following
the first period as opposed to the case with fixed RRR. This feeds back into the
consumption-leisure margin of workers and hours decline by about 0.2% less com-
pared to the fixed RRR economy. This results in stabilizing output on impact and











































































































































Figure 2.6: Impulse Responses Led by a 1-σ Adverse Financial Shock
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2.3.2.4 Financial Crisis Experiment and Credit Policy
The previous two sections illustrated that the macroprudential reserves policy
stabilizes key macroeconomic and financial variables in response to conventional
shocks along the business cycle. In this section, we explore how countercyclical
reserve requirements perform during a financial crisis. The specific experiment is
to consider an exogenous decline in the net worth of financial intermediaries. This
shock crudely captures loan losses, asset write-downs or asset revaluations that we
observe in the recent financial crisis. As stated in the Introduction, it might be
though of as a sharp reversal in the risk appetite of international investors, which
is an exogenous factor that threatens the financial stability of a country such as
Turkey.
Although the initial decline in banks’ net worth that we introduce is exogenous,
there will be second round effects that endogenously trigger an adverse financial
accelerator mechanism. The initial fall in the net worth reduces the amount of
bank credit that can be extended to non-financial firms as banks are not able to
compensate the decline in their internal financing with households’ deposits. Since
non-financial firms finance their capital expenditures via bank credit, there will be
a drop in investment, and hence in the price of capital. The value of intermediary
capital depends on asset prices. The endogenous decline in asset prices leads to a
further deterioration in banks’ net worth, creating an adverse feedback loop of falling
aggregate demand, declining asset prices, and deteriorating intermediary balance
sheets.
99
Specifically, we consider an initiating disturbance of a 5% decline in the net
worth of financial intermediaries. This disturbance will be a one-time shock and we
want to think of it as a rare event. We analyze the effects of this shock in the model
economy with fixed RRR policy and then illustrate the mitigating effects of time-
varying RRR policy on real, financial and monetary variables. Figure 2.6 shows the
impulse responses of real, financial and monetary variables under different policy
regimes.
In the economy with fixed RRR, the negative net worth shock immediately
reduces bank capital by 11% on impact (see the middle panel of figure 2.6). Although
deposits rise due to banks’ increased demand for deposits to compensate the decline
in their internal financing, the deterioration of bank capital causes total financing by
financial intermediaries to shrink. This translates into a reduction in bank credit in
the form of equity purchases to firms by 1.2% on impact. As the demand for firms’
shares is lower, the price of equity falls by 1%. This amplifies the exogenous impact
of the financial shock via endogenous capital constraint of banks and explains the
substantial decline of 11% in the net worth. The decline in bank capital rises their
leverage by 10% on impact. Induced by the shortage in credit and collapse in asset
prices, credit spreads rise by 450 basis points in annualized terms. This in turn
causes firms to cut back their investment severely (by about 6%) due to lower bank
credit and higher cost of financing.
The increase in bank deposits driven by banks’ effort to compensate for the
net worth loss increases reserves balances by 1% in the fixed RRR economy. This
creates an excess demand for monetary base and inflation declines on impact by 0.6
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percentage points (see the bottom panel of figure 2.6). However, since the shock is
transitory, inflation overshoots by 0.7 percentage points in the period that follows the
shock and workers’ expectations regarding the hike in future inflation causes hours
to decline by 2.75% on impact. Therefore, output shrinks by 1.6% as shown in the
top panel of the figure. The dynamics of real balances demand and consumption
velocity of monetary base resemble the expected implication of the dynamics of
inflation.
In the model economy with credit policy, the time-varying rule induces a fall
in the RRR of about 0.6 percentage points since bank credit declines in response to
the negative financial shock. Reserves immediately drop by 11% and eliminate the
collapse in inflation almost completely. Most importantly, the dynamics of reserves
moves inflation in such a way to induce hours and accordingly output to increase
on impact (see the bottom and top panels of figure 2.6).
Following the reduced cost of making equity loans to firms, banks substitute
away their assets from reserves to firm equity, therefore the initial decline in bank
credit is 1% smaller. As the demand for firm equity is higher in the model with credit
policy, the 1% reduction in the price of equity is in the model economy with fixed
RRR policy is almost totally eliminated. This reinforces the intermediary capital
via the leverage constraint and reduces the collapse in bank net worth by 5%. We
emphasize this finding that the macroprudential policy reduces the amplified impact
of the financial shock on bank capital by 50%. Accordingly, the rise in credit spreads
are 200 basis points lower in annualized terms and bank leverage increases by 5%
instead of 10%. As another favorable outcome, investment falls by 5% less than how
101
much it declines in the fixed RRR economy over 5 quarters. To sum up, we obtain
the result that a macroprudential reserve requirements policy that has a first order
impact on the balance sheet of financial intermediaries is the most effective in the
event of a financial turmoil.
For all shocks, the higher the intensity of required reserves policy, which is
measured by a larger φ parameter, the lower is the contraction in real macroeco-
nomic and financial variables. Most importantly, the adverse hike in credit spreads,
which is the indicator of financial frictions in this model economy are eliminated
to substantial degrees as the credit policy is implemented more aggressively. Ad-
ditionally, as expected, the inflationary cost of macroprudential intervention is also
magnified as the policy becomes more intense.
Now we proceed to the next section in which we report the impact of coun-
tercyclical reserve requirement policy on the volatilities of key macroeconomic real
and financial variables.
2.3.2.5 Effects of Time-Varying RRR Policy on Volatilities
Table 2.2 below displays the volatilities of real and financial variables when
TFP and money growth shocks are realized over sufficiently long simulations of
the model economy with three different regimes: (i) fixed RRR, (ii) a moderate
required reserve policy (φ = 5.15), and (iii) an aggressive required reserve policy
(φ = 10). As indicated in the table, the economy with a moderate credit policy
features lower volatilities in real variables such as output, consumption, investment
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as well as in financial variables such as bank credit, loan-deposit spread, and asset
prices, compared to the economy with a fixed RRR policy. Column 4 of the table
shows that as the required reserve policy gets more aggressive, the volatilities of
output, consumption, investment, bank credit, loan-deposit spread, and asset prices
are even lower. We especially want to highlight the 50% decline in the volatilities of
credit spreads and leverage ratio, the 22% decline in the volatilities of investment
and asset prices, and 77% decline in the volatility of bank net worth when the
moderate credit policy is in place. Since volatilities over the business cycle are lower
under credit policy, we consider exploring welfare implications of it worthwhile.
Accordingly, in the following section, we carry out welfare comparisons of different
reserve requirement policies. Finally, we emphasize that as the time-varying RRR
policy gets aggressive, inflation volatility gets higher.
Table 2.2: Volatilities of Real and Financial Variables
Variable Fixed Reserves Credit Policy (φ = 5.15) Credit Policy (φ = 10)
Real Variables
Output 2.77 2.26 2.07
Consumption 1.59 1.47 1.41
Investment 6.01 4.70 4.22
Hours 0.35 2.44 2.62
Financial Variables
Credit 1.08 0.89 0.82
Deposits 1.22 1.76 2.57
Net Worth 4.35 1.24 1.31
Leverage Ratio 4.04 2.01 2.04
Credit Spread 0.28 0.14 0.12
Asset Prices 0.62 0.48 0.43
Monetary Variables
Inflation 0.18 0.27 0.37
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2.3.2.6 Credit Policy and Welfare
Consider the time-varying reserve requirement policy, denoted by trp, and the
fixed reserve requirement policy, denoted by frp. We define the welfare associated
with the time-invariant equilibrium given by the countercyclical reserve requirement
policy conditional on a particular state of the economy in period 0 as











stand for the contingent plans for consumption and leisure under the time-varying
reserve requirement policy. Similarly, the welfare associated with the time-invariant
equilibrium given by the fixed reserve requirement policy conditional on a particular
state of the economy in period 0 as






where cfrpt and l
frp
t stand for the contingent plans for consumption and leisure under
the fixed reserve requirement policy.
We then compute consumption-based welfare gains for each alternative time-
varying reserve requirement policy (moderate or aggressive). Let λc stand for the
welfare gain of adopting time-varying reserve requirement policy instead of the fixed
one conditional on a particular state in period 0. We define λc as the proportional
increase of regime frp’s consumption plan that a household must demand to be as
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well off under policy regime trp. Therefore, λc is implicitly defined by










Hence, a positive value for λc implies that the time-varying reserve requirement
policy is welfare superior to the fixed reserve requirement policy.
In order to obtain accurate welfare rankings, we perform a second-order ap-
proximation to the policy functions and the welfare given by V0. It is very well-known
that welfare levels would be equal to each other under alternative policy regimes if
we conduct a first-order approximation to the policy functions since the expected
value of endogenous variables would be equal to their non-stochastic steady state
levels across all alternative reserve policies. We then define welfare in the following
recursive form to conduct a second-order approximation to V0:
V0,t = U(ct, lt) + βEtV0,t+1. (2.65)
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006) show that V0 can also be represented as




where V0 is the level of welfare evaluated at the non-stochastic steady-state, and
∆(V0) is the constant correction term, denoting the second-order derivative of the
policy function for V0,t with respect to the variance of shock processes. Therefore,
equation (2.66) is an approximation to the welfare V0,t, capturing the fluctuations
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of endogenous variables at the stochastic steady state.
We compare three different policy regimes in terms of their welfare gains:
(i) a fixed reserve requirement policy, frp, (ii) a moderate time-varying reserve
requirement policy (φ = 5.15), mtrp and (iii) an aggressive time-varying reserve
requirement policy (φ = 10), atrp. We find that the welfare gain of the central
bank following mtrp rather than frp is 0.05% in consumption-equivalent welfare
terms. Moreover, the welfare gain of the central bank following atrp rather than
frp is 0.13% in consumption-equivalent welfare terms. These results indicate that
following an operational time-varying reserve requirement policy is always welfare
improving compared to an inactive reserve policy. Additionally, on quantitative
grounds, these welfare gains are non-trivial as far as closed economy models are
concerned.
2.4 Conclusion
There are certain advantages and drawbacks of using reserve requirements to
achieve financial stability. The main advantages are (i) it is one of the two main
policy tools that most central banks can use, (ii) the central bank does not directly
face any costs since reserve requirements effectively alter the financial sector’s own
balance sheet in order to provide liquidity to the system, and (iii) the central bank
can employ reserve requirements without requiring banks to have low-risk assets as
collateral, which is unlike the re-discount window. On the other hand, there are
some drawbacks of using reserve requirements, including (i) their role as a tax on
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the banking sector, putting depository institutions at a competitive disadvantage
compared to unregulated financial institutions, and (ii) they may lead to rise in the
credit spreads as they put additional costs on financial intermediation. One can
assess the effectiveness of reserve requirements as a financial stability tool through
their effects on credit spreads and bank credit to non-financial sector. Other things
being equal, we expect countercyclical implementation of reserve requirement ratios
to mitigate the decline in credit growth and accordingly moderate the rise in credit
spreads in economic downturns, and curb excessive credit growth in boom periods.
To that purpose, we build a quantitative monetary DSGE model with a bank-
ing sector that is subject to time-varying reserve requirements imposed by the central
bank and endogenous capital constraints due to an agency problem. We model re-
serve requirements as an exogenous policy rule that countercyclically responds to
credit growth in the financial sector in a forward looking sense. We consider the
effects of three different types of shocks: productivity, money growth and financial
shocks. For each type of shock, we find that the time-varying required reserve ra-
tio rule mitigates the negative effects of adverse shocks amplified by the financial
accelerator mechanism on real and financial variables. In each case, it reduces the
intertemporal distortions created by the credit spread at the expense of generating
higher inflation, pointing out the clear trade-off between price stability and financial
stability faced by many central banks nowadays. It also reduces the volatilities of
key variables such as output, consumption, investment, bank credit, loan spread
and asset prices, indicating the role of reserve requirements as a macroprudential
policy instrument. Finally, we find that a time-varying reserve requirement policy
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achieves a higher welfare than a fixed reserve requirement policy.
This study illustrates that when financial frictions are important, monetary
policy that adopts macroprudential reserve requirement ratios as an instrument
might have real effects even if there are no nominal or real rigidities. Our work is
also timely in the sense that academicians and policy makers are expressing their
doubts about inflation targeting contemporaneously, and accordingly, quantity of
money has emerged as an explicit policy instrument.
There are several further research avenues: one can introduce liquidity shocks
in order to bring a microfoundation to holding reserves in order to rationalize the
optimality of positive reserve requirements. It might also be interesting to focus on
the tradeoff between price stability and financial stability in a framework in which an
interest rate feedback rule is introduced under nominal rigidities such as Christiano
et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007). Lastly, it might also be worthwhile
to study an open economy model to explicitly consider the effects of international




Quarterly seasonally-adjusted data on standard macroeconomic variables ex-
cept Hours are taken from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) of St. Louis
FED. Hours data are taken from Current Employment Statistics survey published
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. GDP deflator from NIPA accounts is used to
deflate the time series of the nominal macro aggregates. Consumption is the sum of
“Personal consumption expenditures on nondurables” (PCND) and “Personal con-
sumption expenditures on services”. Investment is the sum of “Personal consump-
tion expenditures on durables” (PCDG) and “Gross private domestic investment”
(GPDI). GDP is the sum of Consumption and Investment. Hours is computed as
the multiplication of “average weekly hours in private sector” with “average number
of workers in private sector”. Quarterly time series of capital stock to obtain zt se-
ries are constructed using the approach described in the online appendix of Jermann
and Quadrini (2010).
Quarterly financial time series of Bank assets and Bank liabilities are con-
structed using the monthly data on Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks in
the U.S. from Data Download Program of Statistical & Historical Database of the
Federal Reserve Board. Financial data at the FED board are seasonally-adjusted
but nominal. GDP deflator from NIPA accounts is used to deflate the financial time
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series. Bank assets are bank credit at the asset side of the balance sheet of the U.S.
commercial banks. Bank liabilities are deposits held at the U.S. commercial banks.
Quarterly time series of Loan spread are taken from Survey of Terms of Business
Lending from Statistical & Historical Database of the FED Board. Loan spread is
commercial and industrial loan spread over intended federal funds rate. Quarterly
deposit rates are constructed using monthly data on 3-month certificate of deposit
secondary market rate from FRED. The inflation rate computed from GDP deflator
is used to make nominal deposit rate data real.
Table A.1: Business Cycle Properties of Real and Financial Variables, Quarterly U.S.
Data, 1987.Q1-2007.Q1
Standard
Deviation xt−4 xt−3 xt−2 xt−1 xt xt+1 xt+2 xt+3 xt+4
Real Variables
Output 1.48 0.15 0.39 0.66 0.88 1.00 0.87 0.66 0.39 0.15
Consumption 0.44 -0.20 0.07 0.37 0.66 0.82 0.80 0.67 0.46 0.25
Investment 2.68 0.27 0.49 0.71 0.87 0.97 0.82 0.59 0.33 0.09
Hours 0.96 -0.01 0.19 0.43 0.65 0.83 0.89 0.83 0.68 0.44
Financial Variables
Bank credit 0.82 0.07 0.21 0.34 0.45 0.54 0.56 0.57 0.50 0.39
Deposits 0.83 0.09 0.00 -0.09 -0.19 -0.29 -0.37 -0.36 -0.31 -0.24
Net Worth 5.29 0.03 0.20 0.38 0.55 0.70 0.76 0.74 0.63 0.47
Leverage Ratio 5.99 0.00 -0.16 -0.34 -0.51 -0.65 -0.70 -0.68 -0.56 -0.39
Loan Spread 0.09 -0.18 -0.23 -0.32 -0.34 -0.35 -0.22 -0.17 -0.09 -0.03
a Business cycle statistics in the table are based on HP-filtered cyclical components of quarterly empirical time
series (smoothing parameter:1600).
b The standard deviation of output is expressed in percent; standard deviations of the remaining variables are
normalized by the standard deviation of output (std(x)/std(GDP)).
c The correlation coefficients in bold font are the maximum ones in their respective rows.
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A.2 Proofs
A.2.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Let’s conjecture that the bank’s franchise value is given by
Vjt = νtqtsjt + ηtnt (A.1)
Comparing the conjectured solution for Vjt to the expected discounted terminal net








(1 − θ)θiβi+1Λt,t+1+i(1 + rt+1+i)njt+i (A.3)
I write νt and ηt recursively using the expression above. Let’s begin with νt. To









νt = (1 − θ)βΛt,t+1(rkt+1 − rt+1) +
∞∑
i=1






(1−θ)θi+1βi+1Λt+1,t+2+i [(rkt+2+i − rt+2+i)xt+1,t+1+i]
(A.6)
The infinite sum at the right-hand side of equation (A.6) is one period updated









Hence, we can re-write (A.6) with the expectations as follows:
νt = Et[(1 − θ)βΛt,t+1(rkt+1 − rt+1) + βΛt,t+1θxt,t+1νt+1] (A.8)








ηt = (1 − θ)βΛt,t+1(1 + rt+1) +
∞∑
i=1







The infinite sum at the right-hand size of equation (A.11) is one period updated








Hence, we can re-write equation (A.11) with the expectations as follows:
ηt = Et[(1 − θ)βΛt,t+1(1 + rt+1) + βΛt,t+1θzt,t+1ηt+1] (A.13)
A.2.2 Proof of Proposition 2






(1 − θ)θiβi+1Λt,t+1+i[(rkt+1+i − rt+1+i)qt+isjt+i + (1 + rt+1+i)njt+i]
(A.14)
s.t. Vjt ≥ λqtsjt (µt) (A.15)
where µt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the incentive compatibility con-
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straint. Using the solution for Vjt in Proposition 2, I can re-write the intermediary’s
maximization problem using the Lagrangian,
 L = νtqtsjt + ηtnjt + µt[νtqtsjt + ηtnjt − λqtsjt] (A.16)
The first order conditions w.r.t. sjt and µt are given respectively by
(1 + µt)νtqt = µtλqt (A.17)
Vjt − λqtsjt = 0 (A.18)





Therefore, we establish that the incentive compatibility constraint binds (µt > 0)
as long as expected discounted marginal gain of increasing bank assets is positive.
Replacing the definition of νt, we obtain







Imposing the steady-state, we get the following expression,
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(rk − r) =
(1 − βθ)µλ
(1 − θ)β(1 + µ)
(A.22)
As long as µ is positive, i.e. the incentive compatibility constraint binds, risk pre-
mium is positive. Since I solve the model using linear approximation around the
steady-state and the shocks are sufficiently small, the premium is always positive in
numerical simulations.
115
A.3 Business Cycle Statistics of Aggregate Financial Variables of the
whole U.S. Financial Sector
For interested readers, this section documents empirical cyclical properties of
aggregate measures of the leverage ratio, debt and equity of U.S. financial firms and
of the credit spread using quarterly data for the period 1952-2009. In particular, I
compute standard business cycle statistics of the aggregate financial variables, such
as their standard deviations, cross-correlations with output.
I use quarterly balance sheet data from the Flow of Funds Accounts of the
Federal Reserve Board.1 The theoretical model described below treats the entire
financial intermediary sector as a group of identical institutions although there is
a considerable amount of heterogeneity among financial institutions in terms of
both their functions and balance sheet structures. For example, some financial
intermediaries such as private pension funds, mutual funds, retirement funds, are
financed only by equity while some others such as banks, security-brokers and dealers
use leverage extensively. In order to be consistent with the model, I only select
financial institutions that always carry some leverage.
I focus on both depository and non-depository financial institutions. The de-
pository institutions are U.S. chartered commercial banks, savings institutions, and
credit unions. The non-depository institutions are issuers of asset-backed securities,
bank holding companies, security brokers and dealers, finance companies, insurance
1Total financial assets and total liabilities in the Flow of Funds Accounts are partly measured
at book values and may be different from market values. The differences between book values
and market values are more likely to disappear when the balance sheet of a particular financial
institution is marked to market and/or when total financial assets or liabilities are short-term.
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companies, funding corporations, and real estate investment trusts. These institu-
tions perform the majority of activity in the U.S. financial sector as measured by
their total assets.2 Liabilities are defined as the sum of “Total liabilities” of each
of the aforementioned depository and non-depository financial institutions in the
U.S. financial system, while Net Worth is defined as the sum of “Total financial
assets” minus the sum of “Total liabilities” of the same institutions. Leverage ratio
is the ratio of Liabilities to Net Worth. Credit spread measure I use is the difference
between quarterly real return to capital and quarterly real deposit rate. Quarterly
real return to capital data are taken from Gomme et.al. (2011). Quarterly deposit
rate data is taken from Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) of St. Louis FED.
I use quarterly inflation rate computed using GDP deflator to make nominal deposit
rates real.
Quarterly financial data are taken from the Flow of Funds Accounts (FFA)
of the Federal Reserve Board. Quarterly real data except Hours and deposit rate
data are taken from Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) of St. Louis FED.
Hours data are taken from Current Employment Statistics survey published by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics. The return to capital data are taken from Gomme et
al. (2011). This paper constructs an empirical measure of the return to capital
for the U.S., which directly corresponds to the definition of the return to capital
in this paper. The balance sheet data in the level tables of FFA are nominal and
2The total assets of these institutions is 90% of the total assets of the U.S. financial sector.
Moreover, our definition of U.S. financial sector includes important marked based financial insti-
tutions such as security broker&dealers, finance companies, asset backed security (ABS) issuers,
and commercial banks as Adrian and Shin (2009) suggest. They argue that the balance sheet
fluctuations of these institutions are important determinants of real fluctuations.
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are not seasonally adjusted. All financial data are seasonally adjusted using Census
X12 and are deflated using GDP deflator. I use FFA coded level tables released on
March 10, 2011 when I refer to the balance sheet items of financial sector. Financial
and real data sources for figures 1 and 2, and tables 1 and 2 are given below.
Liabilities are the sum of “Total liabilities” of each of the following financial
institutions: U.S. chartered commercial banks (Table L.110, Line 23), savings in-
stitutions (Table L.114, Line 23), credit unions (Table L.115, Line 16), issuers of
asset-backed securities (Table L.126, Line 11), bank holding companies (Table L.112,
Line 11), security brokers and dealers (Table L.129, Line 13), finance companies (Ta-
ble L.127, Line 10), property-casualty insurance companies (Table L.116, Line 16),
life insurance companies (Table L.117, Line 16), funding corporations (Table L.130,
Line 12), and real estate investment trusts (Table L.128, Line 11).
Net Worth is the sum of “Total financial assets” minus the sum of “Total
liabilities” of each of the following financial institutions: U.S. chartered commercial
banks (Table L.110, Line 1 minus Line 23), savings institutions (Table L.114, Line 1
minus Line 23), credit unions (Table L.115, Line 1 minus Line 16), issuers of asset-
backed securities (Table L.126, Line 1 minus Line 11), bank holding companies
(Table L.112, Line 1 minus Line 11), security brokers and dealers (Table L.129, Line
1 minus Line 13), finance companies (Table L.127, Line 1 minus Line 10), property-
casualty insurance companies (Table L.116, Line 1 minus Line 16), life insurance
companies (Table L.117, Line 1 minus Line 16), funding corporations (Table L.130,
Line 1 minus Line 12), and real estate investment trusts (Table L.128, Line 1 minus
Line 11).
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Leverage Ratio is is the ratio of Liabilities to Net Worth. Finally, Credit
Spread is computed as the difference between the quarterly return to capital and
the quarterly deposit rate.
Consumption is the sum of “Personal consumption expenditures on nondurables”
(PCND) and “Personal consumption expenditures on services”. Investment is the
sum of “Personal consumption expenditures on durables” (PCDG) and “Gross pri-
vate domestic investment” (GPDI). GDP is the sum of Consumption and Invest-
ment. Hours is computed as the multiplication of “average weekly hours in private
sector” with “average number of workers in private sector”.
Table A.2: Business Cycle Statistics, Quarterly U.S. Data, 1952-2009
GDP C I Leverage R. Liabilities Net Worth Credit Spread
Standard deviation (%) 1.97 0.89 5.56 5.33 2.16 5.76 0.22
Quarterly autocorrelation 0.83 0.86 0.82 0.74 0.92 0.79 0.75
GDP 1 0.54 0.96 -0.08 0.57 0.28 -0.56
C – 1 0.29 0.10 0.07 -0.08 -0.05
Correlation matrix I – – 1 -0.10 0.63 0.33 -0.62
Leverage R. – – – 1 -0.03 -0.92 0.14
Liabilities – – – – 1 0.40 -0.51
Net Worth – – – – – 1 -0.32
Credit Spread – – – – – 1
a Business cycle statistics for GDP, consumption and investment are computed using quarterly data from FRED
database. Consumption is the sum of personal consumption expenditures on nondurables and services (PCND +
PCESV). Investment is the sum of personal consumption expenditures on durable goods and gross private domestic
investment (PCDG + GPDI). GDP is the sum of consumption and investment.
b Business cycle statistics in the table are based on HP-filtered cyclical components over the period 1952-2009.
c The correlation coefficients greater than 0.13 are statistically significant at 5% significance level.
Table A.1 presents business cycle statistics for the aggregate leverage ratio, ag-
gregate liabilities, and aggregate equity of U.S. financial sector together with those
for the credit spread. The volatility of the leverage ratio is nearly 3 times larger
than that of output and is roughly equal to that of investment. Table 1 shows
that the financial leverage ratio is acyclical. The contemporaneous correlation be-
tween the financial leverage ratio and output is -0.08. The volatility of aggregate
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equity is 3 times larger than that of output, while the volatility of aggregate debt is
roughly equal to that of output.3 The contemporaneous correlation between aggre-
gate liabilities and output is 0.57 while that between aggregate equity and output
is 0.28, indicating that both series are procyclical.4 Moreover, the contemporane-
ous correlation with between credit spread and GDP is -0.56, showing that it is
countercyclical.
Table A.3: Cross Correlations of Financial Variables with Lags and Leads of GDP
Variable Yt−5 Yt−4 Yt−3 Yt−2 Yt−1 Yt Yt+1 Yt+2 Yt+3 Yt+4 Yt+5
Liabilities 0.01 0.13 0.27 0.41 0.52 0.57 0.57 0.50 0.39 0.26 0.12
NetWorth 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.14 0.21 0.28 0.34 0.35 0.31 0.20 0.05
LeverageR. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.08 -0.14 -0.18 -0.18 -0.10 0.00
Spread 0.28 0.17 0.03 -0.15 -0.34 -0.56 -0.67 -0.60 -0.46 -0.29 -0.11
a See the footnote (b) in Table 2 for the construction of aggregate financial variables.
b Business cycle statistics in the table are based on HP-filtered cyclical components over the period 1952-
2009.
c The correlation coefficients greater than 0.13 are statistically significant at 5% significance level.
Table A.2 displays the cross-correlations of financial variables with different
lags and leads of GDP. It shows that aggregate financial variables lead business cy-
cles in the U.S. In particular, the financial leverage ratio, equity and credit spread
lead output by three, two and one quarters, respectively. However, liabilities con-
temporaneously move with output.
The following facts emerge from the empirical analysis above: (1) Financial
3Using the Flow of Funds database, Jermann and Quadrini (2009) shows that relative volatili-
ties of non-financial sector debt and equity to nonfinancial business sector GDP are 1.29 and 1.05,
respectively.
4Jermann and Quadrini (2009) find that debt is countercyclical and equity is procyclical for
non-financial firms for the same time period. In addition, using Compustat database, Covas and
Den Haan (2006) shows that debt and equity issuance is procyclical for the majority of publicly
listed firms.
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leverage ratio and equity are three times more volatile than output, liabilities are a
little more volatile than output, (2) liabilities and equity are procyclical, financial
leverage ratio is acyclical, and credit spread is countercyclical, and (3) Financial
leverage ratio, equity and credit spread lead output by three, two and one quarters,
respectively, while liabilities contemporaneously move with output.
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A.4 Alternative Measures of Financial Shocks
This section presents alternative measures of financial shocks and the simula-
tion results of the benchmark models under these alternative measures. I label the
benchmark model presented in the text as Benchmark 1.
The first alternative measure for ωt series is constructed using the charge-off
and delinquency rates of all loans, the level of outstanding loans, and net worth of
U.S. commercial banks from the Federal Reserve Board:
ωt =
(1 − Loanlossrates) ∗Outstandingloans
Networth
(A.23)
Then I construct the log-deviation of ωt series by linearly detrending the log
of these series over the period 1987.Q1-2010.Q4. The ωt series can be interpreted
as the level of recovery rates of loans as a percentage of net worth. These recovery
rates determine the level of credit conditions in the economy since banks’ ability to
extend loans to non-financial businesses depends on their level of net worth, which
can be seen from equation (1.20). Therefore, the innovations to ωt are shocks to
the recovery rates, hence to the level of financial conditions in the economy. First, I
estimate a VAR(1) for both TFP series and this alternative measure of ω. However,
the cross-terms in the VAR coefficient matrix are not statistically significant at 5%
significance level. Then I estimate two independent AR(1) processes for both series.
The resulting persistence of the ω series is ρω = 0.9690 and the standard deviation
of the shock is σω = 0.003111. The levels of zt and ωt series and the innovations to
those series are plotted in Figure A.1. I label the model driven by both standard
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productivity shock and this alternative measure of financial shock as Benchmark 2.
The second alternative measure for ωt series is constructed by calibrating the
persistence, ρω, and the standard deviation of the shock, σω, to match the persistence
and the volatility of net worth in the data. The resulting persistence is ρω = 0.55,
and the resulting standard deviation of the shock is σω = 0.04. I label the model
driven by both standard productivity shock and this alternative measure of financial
shock as Benchmark 3.
Finally, the third alternative measure for ωt series is constructed as in the main
text. However, this time I estimate a VAR(1) for both TFP and ω series instead of


























The resulting parameters are ρz = 0.9467, ρz,ω = -0.0142, ρω,z = 0.9129, ρω =
0.2824, σz = 0.006378, and σω = 0.0489. I assume that the shocks are i.i.d. as the
correlation coefficient between the innovations is not statistically significant at 5%
significant level. I label the model driven by both standard productivity shock and
this alternative measure of financial shock as Benchmark 4.
Table A.3 presents the business cycle properties of real and financial variables
of four different benchmark models under alternative financial shock measures. The
table suggests that main results of the paper don’t change across under alternative
financial shock series: all of the benchmark models are able to reproduce the key
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business cycle facts about real variables: consumption and hours are less volatile
than output, while investment is more volatile. Investment and hours are highly
procyclical. However, Benchmark 1, 3 and 4 generates a counterfactual negative or
zero correlation between consumption and output. Moreover, Benchmark 4 predicts
higher volatilities in real variables compared to other three models. In terms of
financial variables, all of the benchmark models can explain most of the key empirical
regularities about aggregate financial variables: bank assets, deposits, and spread are
less volatile than output, while net worth and leverage ratio are more volatile. Assets
and net worth are procyclical, while leverage ratio and spread are countercyclical.
Benchmark 1 and 3 predict countercyclical deposits, consistent with the data, while
Benchmark 2 and 4 generate procyclical deposits, contrary to the data. Overall,
regardless of which financial shock measure is taken, we can say that financial shocks
help the theoretical model explain financial fluctuations better, while preserving
most of its predictions about real variables.
For interested readers, I also include the figures A.2 to A.9 that display the
quarterly time series of real variables in the data, in the standard RBC model with
capital adjustment costs, and in the benchmark model economies (2 and 4) and
that display the quarterly time series of financial variables in the data, in the model
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Figure A.9: Financial Fluctuations: Benchmark 4 vs. Only Productivity
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Figure A.12: Financial Fluctuations: Benchmark 1 vs. Only Productivity
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Table A.4: Real and Financial Statistics
Statistic Data Benchmark 1 Benchmark 2 Benchmark 3 Benchmark 4
σY 1.80 1.81 1.65 1.83 2.75
σC 0.45 0.75 0.52 0.77 0.57
σI 2.73 4.64 3.77 4.68 5.13
σL 0.91 0.84 0.64 0.88 0.94
ρY,I 0.97 0.87 0.92 0.88 0.97
ρY,C 0.82 -0.03 0.34 -0.09 -0.70
ρY,L 0.83 0.81 0.86 0.81 0.96
σAssets 0.93 0.58 0.53 0.57 0.69
σDeposits 0.69 0.87 0.44 0.74 0.74
σNetWorth 5.17 5.90 2.10 5.17
∗ 4.21
σLeverageR. 5.61 6.40 2.18 5.92 3.68
σSpread 0.08 0.23 0.11 0.22 0.17
ρY,Assets 0.30 0.88 0.91 0.87 0.86
ρY,Deposits -0.39 -0.23 0.48 -0.21 0.19
ρY,NetWorth 0.52 0.68 0.82 0.67 0.70
ρY,LeverageR. -0.49 -0.71 -0.57 -0.66 -0.60
ρY,Spread -0.39 -0.67 -0.78 -0.70 -0.83
a Business cycle statistics in the table are based on HP-filtered cyclical components of quarterly simulated time series
(smoothing parameter:1600).
b The standard deviation of output is expressed in percent; standard deviations of the remaining variables are normalized
by the standard deviation of output (std(x)/std(GDP)).
c ∗ denotes calibration target.
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Appendix B
B.1 Banks’ Profit Maximization Problem
Let’s conjecture that the bank’s franchise value is given by
Vjt = νtqtsjt + ηtnt (B.1)
Comparing the conjectured solution for Vjt to the expected discounted terminal net










































(1 − θ)θiβi+1Λt,t+1+iRRt+injt+i (B.5)
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We write νt and ηt recursively using the expressions above. Let’s begin with νt. To








. Let’s separate (B.6) into two parts.
νt = (1 − θ)βΛt,t+1ESPt +
∞∑
i=1
(1 − θ)θiβi+1Λt,t+1+iESPt+ixt,t+i (B.7)






The infinite sum at the right-hand side of equation (B.8) is one period updated









Hence, we can re-write (B.8) with the expectations as follows:
νt = Et[(1 − θ)βΛt,t+1ESPt + βΛt,t+1θxt,t+1νt+1] (B.10)
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. Let’s separate (B.11) into two parts.
ηt = (1 − θ)βΛt,t+1RRt +
∞∑
i=1
(1 − θ)θiβi+1Λt,t+1+iRRt+izt,t+i (B.12)
Rearrange the second term at the right-hand size of the expression (B.12),





The infinite sum at the right-hand size of equation (B.12) is one period updated









Hence, we can re-write equation (B.12) with the expectations as follows:
ηt = Et[(1 − θ)βΛt,t+1RRt + βΛt,t+1θzt,t+1ηt+1] (B.15)







(1 − θ)θiβi+1Λt,t+1+iESPt+iqt+isjt+i +RRt+injt+i] (B.16)
s.t. Vjt ≥ λqtsjt (µt) (B.17)
where µt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the incentive compatibility con-
straint. Using the conjectured solution for Vjt above, we can re-write the interme-
diary’s maximization problem using the Lagrangian,
 L = νtqtsjt + ηtnjt + µt[νtqtsjt + ηtnjt − λqtsjt] (B.18)
The first order conditions w.r.t. sjt and µt are given respectively by
(1 + µt)νtqt = µtλqt (B.19)
Vjt − λqtsjt = 0 (B.20)





Therefore, we establish that the incentive compatibility constraint binds (µt > 0)
as long as expected discounted marginal gain of increasing bank assets is positive.
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B.2 Impulse Responses under an Alternative RRR Policy Rule reacting to Current Credit Growth
143




















































































































Figure B.1: The Effect of Adverse TFP Shocks on Real Variables
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Figure B.2: The Effect of Adverse TFP Shocks on Financial Variables
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Figure B.3: The Effect of Adverse TFP Shocks on Monetary Variables
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Figure B.4: The Effect of Adverse Money Growth Shocks on Real Variables
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Figure B.5: The Effect of Adverse Money Growth Shocks on Financial Variables
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Figure B.6: The Effect of Adverse Money Growth Shocks on Monetary Variables
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Figure B.7: The Effect of Adverse Financial Shocks on Real Variables
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Figure B.8: The Effect of Adverse Financial Shocks on Financial Variables
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Figure B.9: The Effect of Adverse Financial Shocks on Monetary Variables
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Figure B.12: Impulse Responses Led by a 1-σ Adverse Financial Shock
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Figure B.15: Impulse Responses Led by a 1-σ Adverse Financial Shock
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